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A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT STATE STRUCTURES FOR 
REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES 
Elizabeth F. Brown* and Edward F. Buckley** 
ABSTRACT 
Within the past thirty-five years approximately fifty nations have 
consolidated their financial regulatory agencies into either a single 
integrated agency or into two semi-integrated agencies. The United States 
has resisted this trend, due in part to a concern that the costs of such 
significant consolidation would exceed its benefits. The existing studies 
that compare the costs of the consolidated regulators around the world 
with the United States regime have often been discounted because they 
have been unable to control for differences in culture and regulatory 
intensity between those other countries and the United States. This article 
attempts to address this problem by examining the costs of six different 
regulatory structures used by states within the United States, which range 
from separate agencies for each financial services industry to a single 
agency that regulates all financial services. As a result, this study 
provides a better picture of whether consolidation within the United 
States might result in any cost savings.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past thirty-five years, at least twenty-three countries, including 
the United Kingdom and Germany, have consolidated their financial 
service1 regulators to form a single, national financial services regulator 
within each of their countries (although some of these countries moved 
away from a single regulator model in the wake of the financial crisis).2 
Worldwide, roughly fifty countries use either an integrated financial 
regulator or two semi-integrated financial regulators to regulate banking, 
 
 1. In this article, financial services refer to any of the activities considered financial in nature 
pursuant to Section 103 of the GLBA, which include banking, securities, merchant banking, and insurance 
products and services. GLBA, 12 U.S.C.S. 1843 (2004)). This definition of financial services is not 
universally applied by other organizations. For example, the Basel II Capital Accord excludes insurance 
activities from the definition of “financial activities” and excludes insurance entities from the definition 
of “financial entities.” BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS – 
A REVISED FRAMEWORK 7 n.6  (June 2004) (hereinafter BASEL II CAPITAL ACCORD). 
 2. Elizabeth F. Brown, Consolidated Financial Regulation: Six National Case Studies and the 




20Union.pdf; Jose de Luna Martinez & Thomas A. Rose, International Survey of Integrated Financial 
Sector Supervision 13 (World Bank, Fin. Sector Operations & Pol'y Dep't, Working Paper No. 3096, 
2003); James R. Barth et al., A Cross-Country Analysis of Bank Supervisory Framework and Bank 
Performance, 12 FIN. MARKETS, INST. & INSTRUMENTS 67 (May 2003); Ellis Ferran, Symposium: Do 
Financial Supermarkets Need Super Regulators? Examining the United Kingdom's Experience in 
Adopting the Single Financial Regulator Model, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 257 (2003); Marc Quintyn & 
Michael W. Taylor, Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability (IMF, Working 
Paper No. WP/02/46, Mar. 2002); Central Bank of Bahrain, About CBB, Profile, 
https://www.cbb.gov.bh/about-cbb/; FINANCIAL SUPERVISION COMMISSION, ANN. REP. 8 (2011) 
(Bulgaria); Cayman Island Monetary Authority, About CIMA, What We Do, https://www.cima.ky/about-
us; Dominica to Set Up a Single Financial Regulatory Body, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2003; Finland Financial 
Supervisory Authority, About Us, http://www.fin-fsa.fi/en/About_us/Pages/Default.aspx (Finland); FIN. 
SERVICES COMMISSION GIBRALTAR, ANN. REP. 3 (2013); Margit Feher, ECB: Hungary Central Bank 
Independence, Primary Mandate Must Stay Intact, Wall St. J. Aug. 5, 2013, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/emergingeurope/2013/08/05/ecb-hungary-central-bank-independence-primary-
mandate-must-stay-intact/ (discussing merger of Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority with the 
National Bank of Hungary); Central Bank Reform Act 2010 (Act. No. 23/2010) (Ir.) (made the Central 
Bank of Ireland the sole financial regulator); Financial Services Commission Act (Aug. 2, 2001),  
https://moj.gov.jm/laws/financial-services-commission-act (created the Jamaican Financial Services 
Commission); National Bank of Kazakhstan, Financial Supervision, 
http://www.nationalbank.kz/?docid=805&switch=english; Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, About 
SAMA, Functions, http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/AboutSAMA/Pages/SAMAFunction.aspx; 
Taiwan Combining Financial Regulators to Bring in Investors, TAIWAN NEWS, July 1, 2004.  
2
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insurance, and securities firms.3 Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, the 
major arguments for the integration of financial regulators were that the 
lines between financial products and firms were blurring so that some 
insurance products were now fungible with banking products or securities 
products and vice versa.  Moreover, financial conglomerates that straddle 
the banking, insurance, and securities sectors increasingly dominated 
financial markets and posed unique regulatory problems that are best dealt 
with by consolidated financial regulators, and globalization had eroded 
local markets for financial services.4 After the financial crisis of 2008, 
concerns about the inability of multiple financial regulators to deal with 
systemic risks also led some nations, like France and the United Kingdom, 
to reorganize their financial regulators into an integrated or semi-
integrated system of financial regulation.5 
In the decade before the 2008 financial crisis, U.S. politicians and 
academics engaged in a lively debate regarding whether the United States 
should consider consolidating some or all of its financial regulators into 
either a twin peaks model (one regulator for prudential risks and one 
 
 3. Martinez & Rose, supra note 2 at 13; Barth et.al., supra note 2; Central Bank of Bahrain, A 
supra note 2; Bulgarian Financial Supervision Commission, supra note 2; Cayman Island Monetary 
Authority, supra note 2; Dominica to Set Up a Single Financial Regulatory Body, supra note 2; Public 
Law 2003-706 of Aug. 1, 2003, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of 
France], Aug. 2003, p. 13220 (Fr.) (law creating Financial Markets Authority in France); Ordinance No. 
2010-76 of Jan. 21, 2010, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], 
Jan. 2010 (Fr.) (law creating the Prudential Supervisory Authority); Finland Financial Supervisory 
Authority, supra note 2; FIN. SERVICES COMMISSION GIBRALTAR, supra note 2; Feher, supra note 2; 
Central Bank Reform Act 2010, supra note 2; National Bank of Kazakhstan, supra note 2; Taiwan 
Combining Financial Regulators to Bring in Investors, supra note 2. 
 4. Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the United States Needs a 
Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. Miami Bus. L. R. 1, 91-92 (Fall/Winter 2005) 
 5. Int’l Monetary Fund, France: Financial System Stability Assessment 27-28, 35 (IMF Country 
Report No. 12/341, Dec. 2012); H.M. GOVERNMENT, THE COALITION: OUR PROGRAMME FOR 
GOVERNMENT 9 (2010) [hereinafter U.K. Government 2010 Reform Proposal]; H.M. TREASURY, A NEW 
APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 5-7 (June 2011). 
3
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regulator for market conduct risks) or a single agency.6 However, the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 20107, 
for the most part, avoided this debate.8 While it did consolidate the 
functions of the Office of Thrift Supervision into the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve, it did not 
consolidate any other agencies.9 Instead, it created a new one, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.10  
Five years after the financial crisis, several notable former financial 
regulators, including former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, 
began to urge U.S. regulators and politicians to reconsider the need for 
 
 6. For examples of some of the articles and studies debating the consolidation of U.S. regulators, 
see Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 
2359, 2360 (June 1998); Helen A. Garten, US FINANCIAL REGULATION AND THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 
135-138 (2001); Jerry W. Markham, Panel I (Part 2): A Comparative Analysis of Consolidated and 
Functional Regulation: Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives 
Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 319 (2003) 
[hereinafter Markham, Super Regulator]; U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE 
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION – INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE 110 
(Oct. 2004) [hereinafter GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT]; Brown, E Pluribus, supra note 4; 
Charles E. Schumer and Michael R. Bloomberg, To Save New York, Learn from London, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 1, 2006); McKinsey & Co., Sustaining New York’s and the US’ Global Financial Services 
Leadership (2007) [hereinafter MCKINSEY REPORT]; Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, INTERIM 
REPORT (Nov. 30, 2006) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS]; 
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY 
MARKET (Dec. 4, 2007) [hereinafter COMPETITIVE POSITION REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL 
MARKETS]; Richard M. Kovacevich, James Dimon, Thomas A. James, and Thomas A. Renyi, THE 
BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. FINANCIAL COMPETITIVENESS, (The Financial Services Roundtable: Nov. 2007) 
[hereinafter THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ROUNDTABLE REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINT 
FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008) [hereinafter PAULSON TREASURY 
BLUEPRINT]; Howell E. Jackson, A Pragmatic Approach to Phased Consolidation of Financial Regulation 
in the United States, (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 09-19, Nov. 12, 2008) [hereinafter 
JACKSON PHASED CONSOLIDATION PAPER]; Group of 30, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
FINANCIAL STABILITY (Jan. 15, 2009) [hereinafter GROUP OF 30 REPORT]; U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM -A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND 
REGULATION (2009) [hereinafter OBAMA WHITE PAPER ON FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM]; 
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A PLAN FOR REGULATORY 
REFORM (June 2009) [hereinafter GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL 
MARKETS]; Adriane Fresh and Martin Neil Baily, What Does International Experience Tell Us About 
Regulatory Consolidation? PEW FINANCIAL REFORM PROJECT, BRIEFING PAPER NO. 6 (2009); Sheila C. 
Bair, The Case Against a Super Regulator, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2009) at A29; and BIPARTISAN POLICY 
CENTER, DODD-FRANK’S MISSED OPPORTUNITY: A ROAD MAP FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE REGULATORY 
ARCHITECTURE 8 (Apr. 2014). 
 7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as scattered sections of 12, 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 8. Kevin McCoy, Dodd-Frank act: After 3 years, a long to-do list, Progress of Dodd-Frank Act 
Slow but Steady, USA TODAY, (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/06/03/dodd-frank-financial-reform-
progress/2377603/ 
 9. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 7, §§311-313 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§5411-5413). 
 10. Id. §1011 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §5491). 
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consolidating financial services regulators.11 Volcker was motivated by a 
desire to make government more efficient and responsive. At the time, 
Volcker commented, “I’ve gotten concerned by the seeming impotence 
of federal regulatory agencies . . . [t]oo many agencies overlapping, too 
many opportunities for delay.”12 In 2014, the Volcker Alliance hired a 
project manager to administer its programs aimed at improving financial 
regulation.13 One of the issues this project manager explored, was “the 
benefits from financial agency consolidation,” which resulted in the 
Volcker Alliance report, Reshaping the Financial Regulatory System, that 
recommended the United States adopt a U.K.-style twin peaks model at 
the federal level.14 
The Bipartisan Policy Center issued a report on the same topic in April 
2014.15 The report was titled “Dodd-Frank’s Missed Opportunity: A Road 
Map for a More Effective Regulatory Architecture.” It recommended that 
the existing federal regulators be consolidated into a multi-peaks structure 
with a new federal prudential regulator, a new capital markets regulator, 
and a new federal insurance regulator.16 It also recommended that the 
Federal Reserve serve as both the macro-prudential regulator and as the 
financial stability regulator.17  
One element of the debate on consolidating the U.S. financial 
regulators has involved comparing the costs of the United States' 
regulatory regime with those of other nations that have consolidated 
regimes.18 These studies, however, fail to account for the significant 
cultural and economic differences between the United States and other 
nations, which include, among other things, differences in the laws and 
regulatory intensity of each nation, differences regarding the role of 
government and government regulation in the area of financial services, 
and differences in the complexity and sophistication of the financial 
 
 11. Nelson D. Schwartz, Volcker’s Aim: Responsive Government, N.Y. TIMES, (May 29, 2013). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Volcker Alliance, Position Announcement, Project Manager, (Feb. 11, 2014).  
 14. Volcker Alliance, Position Announcement, supra note 13; VOLCKER ALLIANCE, RESHAPING 
THE FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 6-9 (2015), 
https://www.volckeralliance.org/publications/reshaping-financial-regulatory-system. 
 15. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER, supra note 6. Former Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, 
Tom Daschle, Bob Dole, and George Mitchell formed the Bipartisan Policy Center in 2007. Id. at 2. 
 16. Id. at 8-9. The prudential regulator would assume the prudential responsibilities of the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve. 
The capital markets regulator would merge the functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.  
 17. Id. 
 18. Among the articles that include such comparisons are the following, Brown, E Pluribus, supra 
note 4; Barth et al., supra note 2; Jackson, Howell, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: 
Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (Summer 2007); Markham, 
Super Regulator, supra note 6; and Martinez & Rose, supra note 2. 
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markets in each nation. As a result, one cannot argue with any degree of 
certainty that the United States would achieve significant cost savings if 
it moved toward a semi-integrated or completely integrated financial 
regulatory regime. 
This article attempts to minimize or eliminate the problems found in 
the prior comparisons of national structures by examining the ways that 
the states within the United States regulate financial services. State 
governments in the United States operate over 100 existing state agencies 
that regulate banking, securities, and insurance firms. While the types of 
entities and products regulated by the states are similar, how each state 
chooses to structure the agencies that regulate financial services vary 
considerably. Some states have created a separate agency to regulate 
banks, insurance firms, and securities firms, while other states regulate all 
financial firms with a single financial services department or agency.19  
Examining how the states within the United States regulate financial 
services would eliminate or minimize some of the problems that arise 
when one compares how different countries regulate financial services. 
By minimizing or eliminating many of the significant differences between 
national regimes, one can focus in on the question of whether integrated 
regulation of financial services is more cost effective and beneficial than 
other forms of financial services regulation by looking at the different 
regulatory structures used by the states in the United States.  
Part II briefly discusses the existing nations that use a semi-integrated 
financial regulatory regime or a single financial regulatory regime and the 
comparisons that have been done to date between those regimes and the 
United States. In addition, this section describes why these comparisons 
are of limited value in answering the question of whether the United 
States would achieve some cost savings if it were to consolidate its 
regulators. Part III outlines the current regulatory regimes for financial 
services used among the states within the United States. It also discusses 
why the data from how these regimes operate may, or may not, be able to 
shed some light on whether integrated regulation of financial services is 
preferable from a cost-benefit perspective than the other ways of 
 
 19. THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE-CHARTERED 
BANKING 35 (19th ed., 2003) [hereinafter CSBS Profile]; CAL. DEP'T FIN. INST., ANN. REP. 24-25 (2002); 
GA. DEP'T OF BANKING AND FIN., ANN. REP. (2002); HAW. DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND CONSUMER 
AFFAIRS, ANN. COMPLIANCE RESOL. FUND REP. (2002); IND. DEP'T OF FIN. INST., ANN. REP. 16 (2002); 
IOWA SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKING, ANN. REP. 27 (2002); MISS. DEP'T OF BANKING & CONSUMER FIN., 
ANN. REP. 12-14 (2002); N.Y. BANKING DEP'T, ANN. REP. 1 (2002); S.C. STATE BD. OF FIN. INST., ANN. 
ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (2002); VT. INS. COMM'R, ANN. REP. 10 (2002); WASH. DEP'T OF FIN. INST., ANN. 
REP. 2 (2002); W.VA. BD. OF BANKING AND FIN. INST., ANN. REP. 14, 18, 23 (2002); State of Illinois 
Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, http://www.idfpr.com (last visited May 8, 2019); 
Michigan Department of Insurance and Financial Services website, https://www.michigan.gov/difs/ (last 
visited May 8, 2019). New York Financial Services Law §102 (2014). 
 
6
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regulating financial services. 
Part IV develops the testable hypotheses regarding the factors affecting 
how much states spend to regulate financial services. To test these 
hypotheses, we collected data on how much each state and the District of 
Columbia spent to regulate financial services from 1990 to 2006. For 
purposes of this article, we are only using the data from 2001 to 2004. We 
are only using this sample of the data because the states employed the 
widest range of different regulatory structures during this period. One 
state, Michigan, even had a single regulator with an internal 
organizational structure that replicated the twin peaks structure used in 
Australia and the Netherlands. Thus, we can better replicate the diversity 
of financial regulatory structures that operate around the globe to see how 
the different regulatory structures affect costs.  
Part V will then present the empirical results based on the available 
data on how costly the various regulatory options are and discuss to what 
extent these variations can be attributed to the type of regulatory regime 
used rather than other factors. It focuses only on the direct costs to state 
governments of employing one regulatory regime rather than other. Part 
VI draws some preliminary conclusions based on the results and outlines 
future areas for research.  
II. FINANCIAL REGULATORS 
Table 1 below lists all of the nations in the world that have adopted 
either a single financial services regulator or that have consolidated the 
regulation of two or more areas of financial services regulation into a 
single agency. The first nations to create a single financial services 
regulator were Singapore in 1971 and the Scandinavian nations of 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in the 1980s and early 1990s.20 The 
concept of a single financial services regulatory agency, however, did not 
seem to gain significant appeal until the United Kingdom created its 
Financial Services Authority (“UK FSA”) in 1997.21 Table 1 also shows 
those nations that have adopted a “twin peaks” approach.22  
 
 20. Singapore Monetary Authority, About MAS, Overview, http://www.mas.gov.sg/About-
MAS/Overview.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2014); Martinez & Rose, supra note 2 at 4. 
 21. GROUP OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND 
CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 28-29 (2008). 
 22. Michael Taylor, a former officer with the Bank of England, coined the phrase "twin peaks" in 
his article, Twin Peaks: A Regulatory Structure For The New Century, which was published by Centre for 
the Study of Financial Innovation in 1995. The term "twin peaks" was not used in the final report prepared 
by the Australian Financial System Inquiry, which recommended that Australia adopt a system similar to 
the one outlined in Taylor's article. Financial System Inquiry, Final Report (Mar. 1997),  
http://fsi.treasury.gov.au/content/publications.asp. 
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Table 1: Countries with Either an Integrated or Semi-Integrated 




















































































 23. Brown, Consolidated Financial Regulation, supra note 2; Brown, E Pluribus, supra note 4; 
Martinez & Rose, supra note 2, at 13; James R. Barth, Daniel E. Nolle, Triphon Phumiwasana and Glenn 
Yago, A Cross-Country Analysis of Bank Supervisory Framework and Bank Performance, 12 FIN. 
MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 67 (May 2003); CENTRAL BANK AND FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AUTHORITY OF IRELAND ACT 2003, No. 12 of 2003 Part IIIA, Ch. I, par. 33B (2003); Central Bank of 
Bahrain, Overview, https://www.cbb.gov.bh/about-cbb (Nov. 18, 2018); Bulgaria Financial Supervision 
Commission, About FSC, Establishment, http://www.fsc.bg/en/about-fsc/establishment/ (Nov. 18, 2018); 
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Even in the nations that use one agency to regulate financial services, 
most nations still maintain separate banking, insurance and securities 
divisions within that agency. Very few of the nations that had adopted 
integrated supervision had been able to harmonize regulations and 
supervisory approaches across the financial services industry, although 
they did find a greater degree of consistency between the regulation and 
supervision of banks and securities firms than banks and insurance 
companies.24 Some have speculated that the reasons for this were the 
relative newness of the agencies involved—which were generally less 
than five years old when the surveys were done—and the lack of 
consistency of international standards across the financial services 
industry.25 
The UK FSA initially moved the furthest towards fully integrated 
regulation by regulating based on “objective,” which usually meant 
regulating particular risks, such as prudential or market conduct risks, 
rather than based on industry sector, such as banking, insurance, or 
securities.26 From 1998 to 2000, the UK FSA had a department for 
Financial Supervision that handled prudential risks and a department for 
Authorization, Enforcement, and Consumer Protection that handled 
market conduct risks as shown in Figure 1. In these early years of the UK 
FSA’s existence, its internal structure looked similar to the twin peaks 
model employed by Australia and the Netherlands.27 
 
Cayman Island Monetary Authority, About Us, https://www.cima.ky/about-us; Dominica to Set Up a 
Single Financial Regulatory Body,supra note 2; Finanssivalvonta Financial Supervisory Authority, supra 
note 2; Gibraltar Financial Services Commission, About Us, Our Organisation, What We do and Why, 
https://www.fsc.gi/fsc/whatwedo (Nov. 1, 2018); Gulmira Kapenova, Supervision of the Securities 
Market in Kazakhstan (Apr. 2004), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/30/31739306.pdf; SAUDI ARABIA 
MONETARY AGENCY, A CASE STUDY ON GLOBALIZATION AND THE ROLE OF INSTITUTION BUILDING IN 
THE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN SAUDI ARABIA 12 (Feb. 2004); Financial Supervisory Commission Republic 
of China (Taiwan), About FSC, Introduction, https://www.fsc.gov.tw/en/home.jsp?id=9&parentpath=0,1 
(Nov. 18, 2018); and JACKSON PHASED CONSOLIDATION PAPER, supra note 6 at 13. Canada regulates 
banking and insurance at the national level using a Twin Peak structure with one agency to manage 
prudential risks and another to manage consumer protection issues. In Canada, the regulation of securities 
is handled by its ten provinces and three territories, not its federal government. 
 24. Martinez & Rose, supra note 2 at 31.  
 25. Id. at 31-32. 
 26. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2000/01 11-12 (2001). 
 27. GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 21, at 30. 
9
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Figure 1: UK FSA structure from 1998 to 200028 
 
In 2001, the UK FSA began to move back towards an internal 
organizational structure based on industry segments rather than by 
objectives. From 2001 to 2003, the UK FSA had three main 
departments—one for Deposit Takers and Markets, which supervised 
banks and other depository institutions, one for Consumer, Investment, 
and Insurance, which supervised capital markets and insurance, and one 
for Regulatory Processes and Risk, as illustrated in Figure 2.29 It also has 
a number of cross sector leaders that touch on issues that arise in all three 
departments, such as auditing and accounting and asset management.30 
The UK FSA, however, did not cover all of the financial services firms 
until 2004 when it finally added coverage of mortgage and general 
insurance intermediation.31  
 
 28. UK FSA ANN. REP. 1997/98, Appendix 2: FSA Organisational Chart, 45 (1998); UK FSA 
ANN. REP. 1999/2000, Appendix 2: UK FSA Organisational Chart as of 30 June 2000, 71 (2000).  
 29. UK FSA, ANN. REP. 2001/02 (2002). 
 30. Id. 
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Figure 2: UK FSA structure from 2001 to 200332 
 
 
In 2004, the UK FSA underwent a major reorganization, which 
restructured its departments more along the lines of specific industry 
segments as shown in Figure 3. As a result, its internal structure mimicked 
in many ways the mixture of institutional and functional regulatory 
agencies found in the U.S. regulatory structure and the structures of those 
nations that still maintain separate banking, insurance, and securities 
divisions within a single agency. It kept this structure until 2009 when it 
went through another major reorganization to bring its internal structure 
back to something that more approximated the twin peaks approach with 
a department for Risk and another for Supervision.33 
 
 32. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2000/01, supra note 26, at Appendix 2: Organisational Chart, 72; UK FSA 
ANN. REP. 2002/03, Appendix 2: FSA as of 31 March 2003, 122 (June 2003).  
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Figure 3: UK FSA structure from 2004 to 200934 
 
The United Kingdom eventually moved to a twin peaks structure on 
April 1, 2013 when the U.K. government moved prudential regulation 
back to the Bank of England and converted the UK FSA into the Financial 
Conduct Authority.35 Even with this structure, some financial services 
regulation, such as those pertaining to pensions, are not regulated by the 
Bank of England or the Financial Conduct Authority.36  
 
 34. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2003/04, Appendix 2: FSA June 2004, 50 (June 2004); UK FSA ANN. 
REP. 2005/06, Appendix 2: FSA May 2006, 51 (June 2006); UK FSA ANN. REP. 2008/09, 4 (June 2009). 
 35. Financial Services Act, 2012, ch. 21 (UK); Press Release, H.M. Treasury and Greg Clark M.P., 
Financial Services Bill Receives Royal Assent (Dec. 19, 2012), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/financial-services-bill-receives-royal-assent [hereinafter H.M. 
Treasury Press Release] (act to take effect on Apr. 1, 2013). 
 36. Pensions are regulated by the Pension Regulator and by the U.K. Department for Work and 
Pensions. Pensions Act 2004, ch. 35, Part 1, §1 (2004) (UK). The Pension Regulator took over the 
functions of the Occupational Pensions Review Authority that the Pensions Act 1995 had created to 
regulate workplace pensions. Pensions Act 1995, ch. 26, §1 (1995) (UK). In addition, the Pension 
Protection Fund (“PPF”) protects defined benefit plan participants in the event that a plan became 
insolvent by ensuring that they receive at least a portion of their promised benefits. Pensions Act 2004, 
ch. 35, Part 2, §§108-111. Thus, the PPF acts in ways that are similar to the U.S. Pension Benefit Guaranty 
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Since its inception until its 2008/09 fiscal year, the UK FSA published 
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France, Hong Kong, Ireland, and Singapore.38 As a result, some studies 
have used these figures to make cost comparisons between the United 
States and the other nations covered.39  
Use of the UK FSA numbers is problematic for several reasons, as the 
UK FSA noted. In each of its annual reports, the UK FSA raised the 
following caveats regarding the comparability of the data collected: (1) 
the figures do not necessarily relate to the same accounting period and 
may not have been compiled on the same basis; (2) labor and other costs 
vary between countries; (3) variations in exchange rates will affect the 
results expressed in a single currency; (4) the scope of the responsibility 
of the regulatory authorities differ from one country to the next; and (5) 
the nature and scale of the financial services industries in different 
countries differs materially.40  
In addition to the caveats noted by the UK FSA, several other factors 
also make comparisons between the United States and the other nations 
problematic. These factors include:  
 
• The United Kingdom failed to obtain the regulatory costs for all 
of the financial services regulatory agencies, particularly in the 
case of the United States. 
• The significant cultural differences between the United States 
and other nations affect the way the financial laws are 
implemented and enforced and the way businesses in other 
nations interact with financial services providers. 
• The size of the financial markets that single financial regulators 
monitor in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan are 
considerably smaller than the U.S. market and all of the effects 
of these differences in size cannot be eliminated simply by 
looking at costs from the perspective of costs per billion dollars 
of gross domestic product (“GDP”). 
 
 Comparing the United States with the United Kingdom and Germany 
can provide some idea of how significant these differences may be. For 
example, the United State federal agencies use a fiscal year that runs from 
October 1 to September 30 while most U.S. state financial services 
 
 38. UK FSA ANN. REP. 1999/2000, supra note 28, at Appendix 6, 84-85; UK FSA ANN. REP. 
2000/01, supra note 26, at Appendix 5, 80-81; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2001/02, Appendix 10, 133-38 (2002); 
UK FSA ANN. REP. 2002/03, supra note 32, at Appendix 8, 205-10; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2003/04, supra 
note 34, at Appendix 5, 99-103; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2004/05, supra note 31, at Appendix 5, 111-14 (June 
2005); UK FSA ANN. REP. 2005/06, supra note 34, at Appendix 5, 101-04; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2006/07, 
Appendix 1, 101-04 (2007); UK FSA ANN. REP., 2007/08, Appendix 1, 105-09 (June 2008); UK FSA 
ANN. REP. 2008/09, supra note 34, at Appendix 1, 121-25. 
 39. Jackson, supra note 6. 
 40. For example, see U.K. FSA, ANN. REP. 2004/05, supra note 31, at 111.  
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regulators use a fiscal year that runs from July 1 to June 30.41 The UK 
FSA, however, had a fiscal year that ran from April 1 to March 31 while 
the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht or “BaFin”), which was the single financial 
regulator in Germany until 2013, used the calendar year as its fiscal year.42 
As a result, the UK FSA and the studies that used those numbers are 
comparing data from time periods that are off by at least three to six 
months. 
More importantly, the UK FSA data only included a portion of the over 
115 different state and federal agencies that regulate financial services in 
the United States.43 The UK FSA generally included the costs of the 
Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission 
(“FDIC”), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission (“CFTC”), the National Credit Union 
Administration (“NCUA”), and the budgets of the state insurance 
agencies provided by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (“NAIC”).44 It failed to include the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (“FINCEN”), the Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation (“SIPC”), the Office of the Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (“OFHEO”), which is now the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (“FHFA”), the state banking regulators, the state securities 
regulators, the state savings and loan regulators, and the state credit union 
regulators. As a result, the UK FSA numbers substantially underestimated 
how expensive the U.S. regulatory regime is. 
To provide some idea of how much the UK FSA’s numbers 
underestimated the total cost of state and federal regulation of financial 
services in the United States, the data collected by the UK FSA for 
comparison with its 2002/03 fiscal year placed the total annual regulatory 
 
 41. U.S. Senate, Glossary, Fiscal Year, 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/fiscal_year.htm; National Conference of State 
Legislatures, Quick Fiscal Reference Table, http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/basic-
information-about-which-states-have-major-ta.aspx#fyrs (scroll down to “State Fiscal Years”). 
 42. See UK FSA Ann. Rep. 2008/09, supra note 34, at 2; Int’l Monetary Fund, Germany, 65 Int’l 
Financial Statistics 1447 (Apr. 30, 2012). 
 43. Brown, E Pluribus, supra note 4, at 6; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as scattered sections of 12, 
15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (eliminated the Office of Thrift Supervision but created the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which left the total number of federal financial regulators 
unchanged); New York Financial Services Law, supra note 19, §102 (2014)(created N.Y. Department of 
Financial Services by merging the Department of Banking and the Department of Insurance). The states 
had more than 110 financial regulators before the creation of the N.Y. Department of Financial Services 
and so even after its creation, the total number of U.S. state and federal financial regulators exceed 115 
agencies. 
 44. For example, see UK FSA ANN. REP. 2008/09, supra note 34, at Appendix1, 123-25. 
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costs incurred by the United States at approximately 12 times the total 
annual regulatory costs for the UK FSA.45 The total regulatory costs for 
the United States for 2002 were more than 16 times the annual expenses 
of the UK FSA if all of the annual expenses for the Federal Reserve, the 
OCC, the OTS, the FDIC, the NCUA, the SEC, the CFTC, the OFHEO, 
and the state insurance, banking, and securities agencies were 
combined.46  
In addition, the UK FSA has not been consistent with regard to which 
U.S. agencies it includes. For example, in 2002/03 and 2003/04, the UK 
FSA included the budgets for the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) in 
the U.S. Department of Treasury and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (“NASD”) but left the budgets for these organizations 
out of the charts in later years.47 As a result, the UK FSA numbers 
underestimate the regulatory costs of the U.S. system for the fiscal years 
of 2002/03 and 2004/05 even more than they did in their other annual 
reports. 
Nevertheless, the data collected and published by UK FSA provided a 
starting point for comparison. For purposes of this article in order to make 
the comparisons between the numbers provided in (1) the annual report 
for 2003/04 and (2) the annual reports for 2004/05 and 2005/06, the 
budgets for the OTS and the NASD were subtracted from the total 
regulatory costs listed for the United States for 2003/04. In addition, the 
total expenditures for each country and the total GDP for each country 
were translated into constant 2000 US dollars to eliminate the effects of 
inflation in each country. While the UK FSA provides data for about a 
half dozen countries, this article will only use the United Kingdom and 
Germany as points of comparison because they were the only two nations 
on which the UK FSA collected data that maintained single financial 
regulators for the period between 2002 and 2009.  
  
 
 45. Brown, E Pluribus, supra note 4, at 59-60. 
 46. Id. at 60-61. 
 47. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2001/02, supra note 38, at Appendix 10, 133-38; UK FSA ANN. REP. 
2002/03, supra note 32, at Appendix 8, 205-10; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2003/04, supra note 34, at Appendix 
5, 99-103; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2004/05, supra note 31, Appendix 5, at 111-14; UK FSA ANN. REP. 
2005/06, supra note 34, at Appendix 5, 101-04; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2006/07, supra note 38, at Appendix 
1, 101-04; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2007/08, supra note 38, at Appendix 1, 105-09; UK FSA ANN. REP. 
2008/09, supra note 34, at Appendix 1, 121-25. 
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Figure 5: Total financial services regulatory expenditures by the 
governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany 
(in millions of constant 2000 US dollars)48 
 
 As Figure 5 illustrates, the United States spent at least 12.6 times more 
than the United Kingdom and at least 41.2 times more than Germany to 
regulate financial services in 2002.49 The United States continued to 
spend substantially more than the United Kingdom and Germany for the 
rest of the decade. In 2009, the United States spent at least 8.2 times more 
than the United Kingdom and at least 29.3 times more than Germany to 
regulate financial services.50 
Even if one accounts for the differences in the gross domestic product 
of each country, the United States still spent substantially more than the 
United Kingdom and Germany. In 2002, the United States spent twice as 
 
 48. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2001/02, supra note 38, at Appendix 10, 133-38; UK FSA ANN. REP. 
2002/03, supra note 32, at Appendix 8, 205-10; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2003/04, supra note 34, at Appendix 
5, 99-103; UK FSA ANN. EP. 2004/05, supra note 31, at Appendix 5, 111-114; UK FSA ANN. REP. 
2005/06, supra note 34, at Appendix 5, 101-04; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2006/07, supra note 38, at Appendix 
1, 101-04; UK FSA ANN. REP. 2007/08, supra note 38, at Appendix 1, 105-09; UK FSA ANN. REP. 
2008/09, supra note 34, at Appendix 1, 121-25. Data from UK FSA annual reports converted into U.S. 
dollars using the rates set forth in the Federal Reserve Statistical Release, H.10 - Historical Exchange 
Rates, Spot Exchange Rate, $US/Pound Sterling, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/hist/dat00_uk.htm (last visited May 7, 2019). The dollars 
were then converted into constant 2009 constant dollars using the Inflation Calculator on the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [hereinafter BLS Inflation Calculator]. 
 49. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2001/02, supra note 29, at Appendix 10, 133-38; Federal Reserve 
Statistical Release, supra note 48; BLS Inflation Calculator, supra note 48. 
 50. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2008/09, supra note 34, at Appendix 1, 121-25; Federal Reserve Statistical 
Release, supra note 48; BLS Inflation Calculator, supra note 48. 
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much as the United Kingdom and 8.9 times more than Germany to 
regulate financial services after accounting for differences in GDP.51 
Between 2002 and 2009, the gaps between the United States and the 
United Kingdom and between the United States and Germany both 
narrowed. In 2009, the United States spent 1.3 times more than the United 
Kingdom and 6.2 times more than Germany to regulate financial services 
after accounting for differences in GDP.52 The gap between the United 
States and the United Kingdom narrowed, in part, because the UK FSA 
assumed the responsibility for regulating both mortgage and general 
insurance intermediation for the first time in 2004/05 and because the UK 
FSA needed to spend more to deal with the 2008 financial crisis.53  
Figure 6: Total financial services regulatory expenditures by the 
governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany 
per trillion dollars of GDP (in constant 2000 U.S. dollars)54 
 
 51. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2001/02, supra note 29, at Appendix 10, 133-38; Federal Reserve 
Statistical Release, supra note 48; BLS Inflation Calculator, supra note 48; OECD, Stat Extracts, National 
Accounts, GDP, US$, current prices, current PPPs, millions (customize data for date range 2002 to 2009), 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SNA_TABLE1 (last accessed on May 8, 2019) [hereinafter 
OECD GDP].  
 52. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2008/09, supra note 34, at Appendix 1, 121-25; Federal Reserve Statistical 
Release, supra note 48; BLS Inflation Calculator, supra note 48; OECD GDP, supra note 51. 
 53. UK FSA, ANN. REP. 2004/05, supra note 31, at 5. 
 54. The data from Figure 5 was divided by the GDP amounts for Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States from the OECD GDP. OECD GDP, supra note 51. These amounts were converted 
into constant 2009 dollars using the Inflation Calculator on the Bureau of Labor Statistics. BLS Inflation 
Calculator, supra note 48. 
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If one looks at the comparison of the expenditures based on the 
population of each country in Figure 7, the picture was no better. After 
accounting for difference in population, the United States spent 2.6 times 
more than the United Kingdom in 2002 and the gap narrowed to 1.6 times 
in 2009 as regulatory expenditures increased during the financial crisis.55 
The United States spent 11.8 times more than Germany in 2002, which 
declined to 7.8.1 times more in 2009.56 
Figure 7: Total financial services regulatory expenditures by the 
governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany 
per million people (in constant 2000 U.S. dollars)57  
 
One cannot tell from looking at these comparisons how much more 
expensive the United States is because of its highly fragmented regulatory 
structure. Howell Jackson attempted to address this problem by analyzing 
the budgets and staffing levels of each country.58 He also analyzed the 
securities enforcement actions brought by each country in order to begin 
 
 55. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2001/02, supra note 29, at Appendix 10, 133-38; UK FSA ANN. REP. 
2008/09, supra note 34, at Appendix 1, 121-25; Federal Reserve Statistical Release, supra note 23; BLS 
Inflation Calculator, supra note 48; OECD, Stat Extracts, Population, 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=POP_FIVE_HIST [hereinafter OECD Population]  
 56. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2001/02, supra note 38, Appendix 10, at 133-38; UK FSA ANN. REP. 
2008/09, supra note 34, Appendix 1, at 121-25; Federal Reserve Statistical Release, supra note 48; BLS 
Inflation Calculator, supra note 48; OECD Population, supra note 55. 
 57. UK FSA ANN. REP. 2001/02, supra note 29, Appendix 10, at 133-38; UK FSA ANN. REP. 
2008/09, supra note 34, Appendix 1, at 121-25; Federal Reserve Statistical Release, supra note 48; BLS 
Inflation Calculator, supra note 48; OECD Population, supra note 55. 
 58. Jackson, supra note 18, at 269-77.  
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to determine the regulatory intensity of each nation.59 His analysis, 
however, was preliminary as he did not have comprehensive data for the 
United States. For example, he did not have data regarding U.S. state 
securities regulators’ budgets. He also lacked the budgets for some 
agencies for certain years, and so he extrapolated the data from prior 
years.60 
Jackson’s preliminary conclusions—based on analyses of budgets and 
staffing levels—were that the United States regulates banking far more 
intensely than any other country and is near the top end of the spectrum 
with regard to insurance regulation.61 He also noted that the United States 
regulates securities significantly less intensely than Australia and 
Canada.62 This comparison, however, may be flawed as the budget for the 
United States does not include the costs of U.S. state securities regulators. 
Jackson did note that if one looks at enforcement actions, the United 
States regulated securities more intensely than either the United Kingdom 
or Germany.63 
While recognizing that Jackson’s analysis and conclusions were 
preliminary, it is worth noting that he did not attempt to tease out whether 
the differences in regulatory intensity are due to differences in the scope 
of the laws that regulatory authorities implement or due to cultural 
differences regarding enforcement. For example, a larger percentage of 
the population in the United States and in the United Kingdom own stocks 
than in Germany. This fact was true both before and after the financial 
crisis. In the United States in 2002, 84.3 million individuals, or 29.2 
percent of the total U.S. population, and 52.7 million U.S. households, or 
47.3 percent of all U.S. households, owned equities, either through 
individual stocks or through stock mutual funds.64 In the United 
Kingdom, 23.3 percent of the population owned stocks directly in 1996.65 
In Germany, only 9.8 percent of the population owned any stocks directly 
in 2000.66 More recent data indicates that these percentages have 
declined. In the first half of 2010, only 6 percent of Germans directly 
 
 59. Id. at 278-86.  
 60. Id. at 266, note 16. 
 61. Id. at 270.  
 62. Id. at 269. 
 63. Id. at 278-86. 
 64. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004 7 & 33 (Aug. 26, 2004) 
(Estimated U.S. population in 2002 was 288.2 million and estimated the number of householders at  111.3 
million) https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2004/compendia/statab/124ed/tables/pop.pdf?#  
(last visited May 8, 2019); Investment Company Institute and Securities Industry Association, Equity 
Ownership in America, 2002, 1 (2002), https://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_02_equity_owners.pdf 
 65. Laurence Boone and Natalie Girourard, The Stock Market, the Housing Market and Consumer 
Behavior, OECD ECON. STUDIES NO. 35, 175 (June 22, 2002). 
 66. Id.  
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owned stocks while 10 percent of Britons did.67 The differences continue 
to exist when one takes into indirect ownership of stocks through mutual 
funds or similar investments. In 2009, 44 percent of U.S. households 
owned mutual funds while only 9.4 percent of German households owned 
stock investments.68 Both the United States and the United Kingdom 
regulate their securities markets more intensively than Germany does due 
to the perceived need to protect the larger number of less sophisticated 
investors active in the securities and futures markets in the U.S. and the 
U.K. than in Germany. 
Unless one can eliminate or significantly reduce certain factors, like 
differences in regulatory intensity or cultural attitudes towards 
government regulation, it is difficult to conclude with any certainty that 
if the United States moved to a single financial services regulatory model, 
it would create a more efficient regulatory regime and achieve substantial 
cost savings. As a result, continuing to make adjustments when 
comparing one nation with another might not be the best way to address 
the question: will consolidating regulators into a single regulator create a 
more efficient regulatory regime? 
III. STATE REGULATORY STRUCTURES FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES 
One way of eliminating or reducing many of the factors that arise when 
making nation-to-nation comparisons is to examine whether consolidated 
regulators within the 50 states and the District of Columbia are more 
efficient than multiple regulators. The states use a range of regulatory 
structures that run the gamut from having a separate agency to regulate 
each industry sector to having a single regulator that regulates based on 
risk, like the UK FSA. The data from the states avoids the complications 
created by converting budgets in one currency into another currency for 
comparison. In addition, all but four states use the same fiscal year, July 
1 to June 30, for their budgets.69 As a result, the data being compared 
comes from the same time periods for the most part. The movements to 
encourage states to adopt uniform laws mean that banking, securities, and 
insurance laws do not vary among the states to the same degree that the 
laws governing financial services vary among nations. In addition, the 
extent to which the populations of the different states use different types 
of financial instruments does not vary as substantially as the extent to 
 
 67. Julie Cruz, Why Don't Germans Invest in Stocks?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Sept. 30, 2010), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-09-30/why-dont-germans-invest-in-stocks-
businessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice. 
 68. Id. 
 69. National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 41. The four states who use a different 
fiscal year are Alabama, Michigan, New York, and Texas. Id. 
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which the populations in the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Germany use different financial instruments. As a result, comparing how 
states regulate financial services may provide a better way of determining 
whether, from a cost perspective, the United States would benefit if it 
created a single financial services regulator. 
A. Regulatory Options 
The 50 states and the District of Columbia employ or have employed 
financial regulatory structures that may be classified into six different 
options:  
 
• Option 1: separate agencies to regulate banking, securities, and 
insurance.70  
• Option 2: a semi-integrated agency that regulates both banks and 
securities firms while a separate agency regulates insurance 
companies.  
• Option 3: a semi-integrated agency that regulates both banks and 
insurance companies while a separate agency regulates 
securities firms. 
• Option 4: a semi-integrated agency that regulates both insurance 
companies and securities firms while a separate agency 
regulates banks. 
• Option 5: a single agency that regulates all financial firms, but 
which maintains separate departments for banks, insurance 
companies, and securities firms, which is similar to how most 
single financial regulators are structure, including the UK FSA 
from 2004 to 2009.   
• Option 6: a single agency that regulates all financial services and 
organizes its departments based on regulatory objectives, such 
as prudential concerns and market conduct objectives, which is 
similar to the UK FSA’s structure from 1998 to 2003 and 2009 
to the present. This one is the closest to the twin peaks model 
used by Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands.  
 
Table 2 below lists which states fit within each of these categories. 
 
 70. In some states, the banking regulators also regulate savings and loans and credit unions while 
in other states, such as Texas, the banking regulators only regulate banks and a separate regulator exists 
to regulate savings and loans and credit unions. 
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Table 2: States with Either an Integrated or Semi-Integrated Financial 







































































































 71. Conf. of State Bank Supervisors, State Agency Quick Access, (Nov. 18, 2018) 
https://www.csbs.org/state-bank-agency-contact-quick-access; California Department of Business 
Oversight, About Us, (Nov. 18, 2018) http://www.dbo.ca.gov/About_DBO/default.asp; GA DEP’T. OF 
BANKING AND FINANCE ANN. REP. (2017); Hawaii Department of Commerce and Consumer Affairs, 
Financial Institutions, Regulation, (Nov. 18, 2018) http://cca.hawaii.gov/dfi/regulation/; IND. DEP’T. OF. 
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While many of the states with semi-integrated or integrated financial 
regulators only created these agencies within the last fifteen years, others 
have had such arrangements for decades. Virginia’s Bureau of Financial 
Institutions has been in existence since 1910.72 Other states only 
consolidated their banking and securities following the adoption of the 
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”) and 
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”), 
which preempted significant parts of state securities laws in order to 
eliminate duplication of federal regulations at the state level by, among 
other things, eliminating state registration and merit review of federal 
covered securities. As a result, all states now are limited to registering 
non-federal covered securities and are forced to concentrate on the 
registration of, and taking antifraud enforcement against, certain types of 
securities professionals. Still, other states, like Michigan, were prompted 
to consolidate their financial services into semi-integrated or integrated 
agencies following the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act by 
Congress in 1999, which attempted to shift financial services regulation 
towards a functional regulatory approach, rather than an institutional 
regulatory approach.73  
Michigan attempted to move beyond institutional and functional 
regulatory models and towards a risk regulatory model in 2000. Michigan 
reorganized its financial regulatory structure to focus on regulatory goals 
concerning risks (prudential risks, market conduct risks, etc.) rather than 
on financial sectors.74 Michigan’s Office of Financial and Insurance 
 
FIN. INST. ANN. REP. 13 (2017); Iowa Division of Banking, Who We Regulate, (Nov. 18, 2018) 
https://www.idob.state.ia.us/; MICH. DEP’T. OF CONSUMER & INDUSTRY SERVICES, FIN. INST. BUREAU, 
1999 ANN. REP. 55 (2000); MICH. INS. BUREAU, 1999 ANN. REP. 25 (2000); MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. 
SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2003 ANN. REP. 11 (2004); MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. 
SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2006 ANN. REP. 6 (2006); MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. 
SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2007 ANN. REP. 4 (2007); MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. 
SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2008 ANN. REP. 5 (2008); MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. 
SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2009 ANN. REP. 5 (2009); Mich. Executive Order No. 
2013-1 (Jan. 16, 2013) (creating the Michigan Dept. of Insurance and Financial Services); MISS. DEP’T. 
BANKING & CONSUMER FIN. ANN. REP., 6 (2017); 2002 N.Y. BANKING DEP’T ORG. & MAINT. REP., 1 
(2002); New York Financial Services Law §102 (2014)(created N.Y. Department of Financial Services in 
2011 by merging the Department of Banking and the Department of Insurance); S.C. BOARD OF FIN. INST. 
ANN. ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (2016); Vermont Department of Financial Regulation, 
http://www.dfr.vermont.gov/ (Nov. 18, 2018); WASH. DEP’T. FIN. INST. ANN. REP. 2014-2015, 4 (2015); 
W.VA. 116TH ANN. REP. FIN. INST., 1-2 (2017); State of Illinois Department of Financial and Professional 
Regulation website, supra note 19; North American Securities Administrators Association, Contact Your 
Regulator http://www.nasaa.org/about-us/contact-us/contact-your-regulator/ (Nov. 18, 2018); and Nat’l 
Assoc. Ins. Com., Membership List (revised Aug. 8, 2018), 
http://www.naic.org/documents/members_membershiplist.pdf. 
 72. BUREAU OF FIN. INST., STATE CORP. COM., COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, SUMMARY OF 
OPERATIONS 5 (2013). 
 73. Brown, E Pluribus, supra note 4, at 23. 
 74. Id. 
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Services (“OFIS”) claimed to be “the first state to coordinate regulation 
of financial institutions, insurance, and securities industries under the 
federal Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999.”75 Michigan 
created the OFIS in April 2000 by combining the Financial Institutions 
Bureau, the Insurance Bureau, and the Securities Bureau.76 Frank 
Fitzgerald, who was the commissioner of the Michigan Insurance Bureau 
at the time that the OFIS was created and became the first commissioner 
to lead the OFIS, justified the creation of the new office by stating: "The 
old fire walls are breaking down and the operative word today is 
convergence . . . The new office is intended to improve regulatory 
efficiency.”77  
Initially, the OFIS had three divisions that essentially replicated the 
three former bureaus, which meant that it would have been classified as 
Option Five among the regulatory structures discussed above.78 From 
2002 to 2008, however, the OFIS reorganized its internal structure so that 
it was divided into two offices that regulate based on risk: (1) the Office 
of Financial Evaluation, which deals with prudential regulation and 
supervision, and (2) the Office of Policy, Conduct, and Consumer 
Assistance, which deals with market conduct risks.79 As a result, it 
operated like the UK FSA did in its early years and, in many ways, similar 
to the twin peaks model used by Australia. Its regulatory structure was the 
only one classified as an Option Six for the period of this study.  
In 2008, Michigan abandoned its innovated structure.80 It reverted to 
an internal structure organized along institutional lines with separate 
divisions for specific sectors like banks and trusts, credit unions, and 
insurance companies. In addition, it renamed the OFIS to the Office of 
Financial and Insurance Regulation (“OFIR”).81 In January 2013, 
Michigan Governor Rick Snyder signed an executive order to remove 
OFIR from the Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs and make 
it the new Department of Insurance and Financial Services.82 It retained 
its internal institutional organizational structure.  
 
 75. Id. 
 76. MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2000 ANN. REP. 
(2000) [hereinafter MI OFIS 2000 ANN. REP.]. 
 77. State to Oversee Financial Firms: Engler Plans to Set Up Regulatory Office to Keep Tabs On 
Banks, Insurers, Brokers, DETROIT NEWS (Jan. 28, 2000) at 1B. 
 78. MI OFIS 2000 ANN. REP., supra note 76. 
 79. MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2003 ANN. REP. 
7-8(2003) [hereinafter MI OFIS 2003 ANN. REP.]. 
 80. Press Release, Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, OFIS Renamed 
Office of Financial and Insurance Regulation (April 8, 2008). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Press Release, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder, Snyder signs executive order establishing 
Department of Insurance and Financial Services (Jan. 17, 2013). 
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B. Why Examine State Regulatory Structures? 
1. Benefits of Comparing State Regulatory Structures 
Comparisons regarding how different nations regulate financial 
services face several problems that are minimized or eliminated when 
comparing how states within the United States regulate financial services. 
These problems include: 
 
• Differences in composition and sophistication of the financial 
services industry; 
• Differences in regulatory objectives; 
• Differences in resource endowments, like wages, capital costs 
and education; 
• Differences in enforcement intensity; and  
• Differences in the degree to which the population respects the 
law. 
 
The range of these differences between states in the United States is very 
small or nonexistent. 
Financial conglomerates hold substantial market shares of the financial 
services industry throughout the United States.83 As a result, highly 
sophisticated financial services may be obtained in any state. The range 
of products and services that financial firms can offer may vary, 
particularly in the area of insurance, from state to state, but generally, 
most products and services are available throughout the United States. 
Many of the states have adopted similar laws for regulating financial 
products and firms. In the area of securities, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) began drafting a 
uniform law to regulate the sale of securities in 1922 and proposed the 
Uniform Sale of Securities Act of 1930.84 The second uniform securities 
act proposed by NCCUSL, the Uniform Securities Act of 1956, was 
ultimately adopted by 37 states.85 In 1985, NCCUSL proposed the first 
major revision to the 1956 act and additional amendments were 
distributed in 1988.86 In 2002, NCCUSL promulgated a fourth version of 
the Uniform Securities Act.87 Only a handful of states adopted the 1985 
or the 2002 versions of the Uniform Securities Act.88  
 
 83. Brown, E Pluribus, supra note 4 at 4-5. 
 84. Uniform Securities Act (1930). 
 85. Uniform Securities Act (1956). 
 86. Uniform Securities Act (1985) with amendments. 
 87. Uniform Securities Act (2002). 
 88. Uniform Securities Act (1985) with amendments and Uniform Securities Act (2002). 
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State laws in the area of securities have also been shaped by the federal 
securities regulations. The scope of state regulatory authority has been 
significantly curtailed by federal securities laws, like NSMIA and 
SLUSA, which have preempted states’ ability to regulate certain aspects 
of the securities industry. State securities regulators also regulate broker-
dealers and brokerage firms who sell securities within their states as well 
as investment advisers who manage less than $25 million. Unlike bank 
regulators, state securities regulators traditionally were not primarily 
focused on prudential concerns addressing the stability of the financial 
system and the solvency of the firms operating within it but were more 
focused on protecting investors from fraud by requiring disclosure of all 
material information.89  
State banks are chartered by individual states and can choose to either 
be a member of the Federal Reserve System or not.90 A state-chartered 
bank will be supervised and regulated by the banking commission or 
similar agency of the state that issued its charter.91 If the state-chartered 
bank is a member of the Federal Reserve System, then it will be subject 
to the regulation and supervision of the Federal Reserve.92 If the state-
chartered bank is not a member of the Federal Reserve System, then the 
FDIC will be its primary federal regulator.93 The FDIC also acts as a back-
up supervisor for other national chartered and state-chartered banks, 
which are insured by the FDIC.94  
In the years following the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(“GLBA”), the total number of banks in the United States, both nationally 
chartered and state-chartered, has declined.95 In 2003, state-chartered 
banks comprised at least 75 percent of the total number of banks in the 
United States, but held only 44.6 percent of the total deposits in the United 
States.96 In addition to holding fewer deposits than nationally chartered 
banks, state-chartered banks on average were less profitable than national 
banks in 2003.97  
 
 89. PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL 2D, §12.02[2] (2003). 
 90. Id. at §§2.03[a], 3.02. 
 91. Id. 
 92. 12 U.S.C.S. §§248, 325, 338, 483 (2014). 
 93. 12 U.S.C.S. §1831a (2014). 
 94. 12 U.S.C.S. §§1815 and 1828 (2014). 
 95. FDIC, Statistics on Depository Institutions (May 28, 2004), 
http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/index.asp. The total number of nationally chartered banks declined 15.5 percent 
to 1999 banks in 2003, while the number of state-chartered banks declined 7.1 percent to 5,771 banks in 
2003. Id. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. In 2003, the return on equity for national banks was 16.1 percent, up slightly from 1999 
when the return on equity for national banks was 15.1 percent. Id. The return on equity for state banks 
was 13.0 percent in 2003, down 9.7 percent from the 14.4 percent return on equity that state banks had in 
1999. Id. 
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State-chartered thrifts are also chartered, supervised, and regulated by 
the state savings and loan commissions that granted them their charters. 
The FDIC acts as a back-up regulator for thrifts that are insured by 
Savings Association Insurance Fund (“SAIF”) of the FDIC and examines, 
supervises, and regulates state-chartered savings associations that are 
insured by SAIF.98 In 2003, state-chartered savings and loans comprised 
only 12.2 percent of all of the savings associations in the United States.99  
A dual regulatory system also exists for credit unions. Credit unions 
may be chartered and regulated either by state authorities or by the 
National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”).100 The NCUA also 
contains the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (“NCUSIF”), 
which insures deposits within credit unions.101  
Credit unions cannot serve the general public but can only serve their 
members who generally must share a single common bond based on an 
occupation or community if the credit union has more than 3,000 
members or may share multiple common bonds if the credit union has less 
than 3,000 members.102  
The dual regulatory structures in the areas governing depositary 
institutions has resulted in state laws, which have been heavily influenced 
by federal banking laws in order to maintain the competitiveness of the 
state charters as alternatives to a national charter. As a result, state 
banking laws contain many common features. For example, during the 
period from 2001 to 2004, which is the period that we are using to 
compare the states’ budgets, a majority of states had laws that authorized 
state-chartered banks or their subsidiaries to engage in the following 
activities among others: 
 
• May sell insurance within state (50 states).103 
• May establish or own operating subsidiaries (49 states).104 
• May sell annuities (48 states).105 
• May operate a discount securities brokerage (48 states).106 
• May have competitive equality with national banks (47 
states).107 
 
 98. 12 U.S.C.S. §1463 (2014). 
 99. Office of Thrift Supervision, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 2003 Fact Book 2 (2004). The United 
States had 928 savings associations in 2003, of which 815 had national charters. Id. 
 100. 12 U.S.C.S. §1752(a) (2014).  
 101. 12 U.S.C.S. §1782 (2014). 
 102. 12 U.S.C.S. §1759 (2014).  
 103. CSBS Profile, supra note 19, at 276-81. 
 104. Id. at 304-10. 
 105. Id. at 276-81. 
 106. Id. at 290-95. 
 107. Id. at 311-19. 
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• May operate a full securities brokerage (45 states).108 
• May sell crop insurance (40 states).109 
• May engage in municipal general obligation bond underwriting 
(39 states).110 
• May sell title insurance (38 states).111 
 
States are the primary regulators of financial services only in the 
insurance area. Unlike depository institutions, which are regulated by 
both the federal and state governments, insurance is regulated almost 
exclusively by the states. The state insurance commissions or 
corresponding agency regulate insurance products and insurance 
companies.112 All state insurance commissions also license insurance 
producers, although the exact type of licenses issued varies.113 Some 
states issue a general insurance producer license while others issue 
licenses for each different type of producer, such as individual licenses 
for agents, brokers, solicitors, consultants, and reinsurance 
intermediaries.114 In 2002, there were 7,173 domestic insurers and 3.8 
million licensed insurance producers in the United States.115 In 2017, 
there were only 5,954 domestic insurers in the United States.116 The 
decline in the number of insurers was primarily due to mergers. The 
number of licensed insurance producers had climbed to over 9 million by 
2017.117 
As previously noted, 46 of the 50 states operate on the same fiscal year, 
July 1 to June 30. As a result, the data obtained regarding their budgets 
are more reliably comparable than the data regarding the budgets of the 
United States and the United Kingdom or Germany.  
All of these similarities among state financial laws reduce the 
likelihood that substantial differences in the cost of regulatory regimes 
among states derives from differences in regulatory intensity.  
 
 108. Id. at 290-95. 
 109. Id. at 276-88. 
 110. Id. at 287-89. 
 111. Id. at 299-303. 
 112. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2002 Insurance Department Resources 
Report (2003) [hereinafter NAIC 2002 REPORT]. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 39 and 53. 
 116. National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2017 Insurance Department Resources 
Report 35 (2018) [hereinafter NAIC 2018 REPORT]. 
 117. Id. at 51. 
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2. Problems of Comparing State Regulatory Structures 
Nevertheless, significant differences still exist when one compares the 
states with one another. First, not all states are transparent about how 
much they spend to regulate financial services. While data on how much 
a state spends to regulate banking and insurance usually can be obtained 
easily from the Conference for State Banking Commissioners and the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, data on how much a 
state spends to regulate securities cannot be easily obtained from the 
North American Securities Administrators’ Association (“NASAA”) 
because NASAA does not make it publicly available. In addition, states’ 
spending on securities regulation is difficult to obtain directly from the 
states because, in many cases, the securities regulators are embedded in 
larger departments or offices, which do not publish how much of their 
budget goes to securities regulation. For example, in the period from 2001 
to 2004 covered by our data set, New York regulated securities through 
its Office of the Secretary of State and through its Office of the Attorney 
General. Unfortunately, the publicly available budgets for those offices 
do not disclose how much they spent to regulate securities.  
The size of state GDP from financial services industry can vary 
significantly among the states and, in some cases, are substantially more 
than the differences in the size of the total U.S. GDP from financial 
services when compared to other major developed nations, such as 
Germany and the United Kingdom.118 For example, in 2002, New York’s 
GDP from financial services was $126 billion (in constant 2000 U.S. 
dollars), which was over 192 times as large as Wyoming’s GDP from 
financial services.119 This example is the most extreme case as New York 
has the largest financial services industry and Wyoming has the smallest. 
The average state GDP from financial services was $16.3 billion in 2002. 
The disparities in the size of the U.S. financial services industry in each 
state peaked just prior to the start of financial crisis. In 2006, New York's 
GDP from financial services was $155.2 billion (in constant 2000 U.S. 
dollars), which was 258 times as large as Wyoming's GDP from financial 
services.120 By 2009, this had narrowed substantially. New York's GDP 
 
 118. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross Domestic Product by State, 
https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gdp-state (May 7, 2019) ["BEA State GDP"]. Reportedly, six percent of 
Germany's GDP came from financial services in 2009 while eight percent of the United Kingdom's GDP 
came from financial services. UK 'blocking tough financial rules', BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8270404.stm. 
 119. BEA State GDP, supra note 118. Data on state GDPs' derived from financial services derived 
by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)" under Step 2, "All States and 
Regions" under Step 3, "Finance and insurance" under Step 4, and years 2002 to 2009 under Step 5. Data 
converted into constant 2000 U.S. dollars using the BLS Inflation Calculator, supra note 48. 
 120. BEA State GDP, supra note 118. Data on state GDPs' derived from financial services derived 
by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)" under Step 2, "All States and 
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from financial services in 2009 was down to $136.8 billion (in constant 
2000 U.S. dollars), which was only 184 times as large as Wyoming's GDP 
from financial services.121  
In addition, the relative importance of the financial services industry to 
the overall economy of each state varies significantly. In 2002, the top 
five states with the largest percentage of their GDP derived from financial 
services were:  
1. Delaware (Option 1) – 35.2% of total GDP from financial services 
2. South Dakota (Option 5) – 19.1% of total GDP from financial 
services 
3. New York (Option 1) – 16.0% of total GDP from financial services 
4. Connecticut (Option 2) – 15.3% of total GDP from financial 
services 
5. Rhode Island (Option 5) – 13.3% of total GDP from financial 
services122 
In 2004, Rhode Island slipped from the top five and was replaced by 
Iowa, which remained in the top five through 2009. In 2009, the top five 
states with the largest percentage of their GDP derived from financial 
services were:  
1. Delaware (Option 1) – 36.4% of total GDP from financial services  
2. South Dakota (Option 5) – 19.1% of total GDP from financial 
services 
3. Connecticut (Option 2) – 18.4% of total GDP from financial 
services 
4. Iowa (Option 5) – 16.2% of total GDP from financial services 
5. New York (Option 1) – 15.7% of total GDP from financial 
services123 
 
Regions" under Step 3, "Finance and insurance" under Step 4, and years 2002 to 2009 under Step 5. Data 
converted into constant 2000 U.S. dollars using the BLS Inflation Calculator, supra note 48. 
 121. BEA State GDP, supra note 118. Data on state GDPs' derived from financial services derived 
by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)" under Step 2, "All States and 
Regions" under Step 3, "Finance and insurance" under Step 4, and years 2002 to 2009 under Step 5. Data 
converted into constant 2000 U.S. dollars using the BLS Inflation Calculator, supra note 48. 
 122. BEA State GDP, supra note 118. Data on state GDPs' derived from financial services derived 
by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)" under Step 2, "All States and 
Regions" under Step 3, "Finance and insurance" under Step 4, and years 2002 to 2009 under Step 5. Data 
on state total GDPs derived by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)" 
under Step 2, "All States and Regions" under Step 3, "All industry total" under Step 4, and years 2002 to 
2009 under Step 5. Data converted into constant 2000 U.S. dollars using the BLS Inflation Calculator, 
supra note 48. Then the amount of state GDPs' derived from financial services was divided by the amount 
of state total GDPs to obtain the percentages listed. 
 123. BEA State GDP, supra note 118. Data on state GDPs' derived from financial services derived 
by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)" under Step 2, "All States and 
Regions" under Step 3, "Finance and insurance" under Step 4, and years 2002 to 2009 under Step 5. Data 
on state total GDPs derived by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)" 
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Some people may be surprised that Delaware and South Dakota derive 
a larger percentage of their GDP from financial services than New York, 
particularly since these two states are among the bottom 10 states in terms 
of population. In fact, Delaware and South Dakota have taken advantage 
of a unique feature of federal banking law that affects credit cards. Under 
federal banking law, a national bank may charge its customers up to the 
interest rate permitted by the state in which the bank actually processes 
the credit card transaction.124 National banks are not bound by the interest 
rate limits of the state in which the customer is located, or the interest rate 
limits of the state in which the purchase of goods or services occurred.125 
Neither Delaware nor South Dakota imposes any limit on the interest rates 
charged by financial institutions. As a result, both states have successfully 
attracted a large number of national banks that would like to charge high 
interest rates to their credit card customers.  
In 2002, the five states with the lowest percentage of their GDPs 
derived from financial services were:  
 
46. Idaho (Option 2) – 4.2% of GDP from financial services 
47. Louisiana (Option 2) – 4.0% of GDP from financial services 
48. New Mexico (Option 2) – 3.7% of GDP from financial services  
49. Alaska (Option 5) – 3.3% of total GDP from financial services  
50. Wyoming (Option 1) – 3.2% of total GDP from financial 
services126 
 
 During the first decade of the 21st century, the percentage of Idaho's 
GDP derived from financial services grew to 5.3% by 2009, which 
allowed it to escape the bottom five.127 In 2009, the five states with the 
lowest percentage of their GDPs derived from financial services were:  
 
 
under Step 2, "All States and Regions" under Step 3, "All industry total" under Step 4, and years 2002 to 
2009 under Step 5. Data converted into constant 2000 U.S. dollars using the BLS Inflation Calculator, 
supra note 48. Then the amount of state GDPs' derived from financial services was divided by the amount 
of state total GDPs to obtain the percentages listed. 
 124. Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its 
Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 522, 544 (2004). 
 125. Id. 
 126. BEA State GDP, supra note 118. Data on state GDPs' derived from financial services derived 
by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)" under Step 2, "All States and 
Regions" under Step 3, "Finance and insurance" under Step 4, and years 2002 to 2009 under Step 5. Data 
on state total GDPs derived by selecting "Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars)" 
under Step 2, "All States and Regions" under Step 3, "All industry total" under Step 4, and years 2002 to 
2009 under Step 5. Data converted into constant 2000 U.S. dollars using the BLS Inflation Calculator, 
supra note 48. Then the amount of state GDPs' derived from financial services was divided by the amount 
of state total GDPs to obtain the percentages listed. 
 127. Id. 
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46. Hawaii (Option 5) – 4.3% of GDP from financial services 
47. New Mexico (Option 2) – 4.07% of GDP from financial services 
48. Louisiana (Option 2) – 3.9% of GDP from financial services 
49. Alaska (Option 5) – 3.7% of total GDP from financial services  
50. Wyoming (Option 1) – 2.5% of total GDP from financial 
services128 
 
Given the importance that oil and agriculture play in the economies of 
these states, and the relatively small populations of Alaska, Hawaii, 
Idaho, and New Mexico compared to the rest of the states, it is perhaps 
not surprising that financial services do not play a significant role in their 
economies. 
States also show a wide variation in how much of their overall state 
budgets goes to regulate financial services. In no state does financial 
services regulation make up more than 1% of the state budget and the 
states with the largest GDPs from financial services do not spend a larger 
percentage of their state budgets to regulate financial services. In 2002, 
the top five states that spend the largest percentage of the total state budget 
to regulate financial services were: 
 
1. Vermont (Option 5) – 0.90%  
2. New Hampshire (Option 1) – 0.66%  
3. North Dakota (Option 1) – 0.57%  
4. Arkansas (Option 1) – 0.53%  
5. Nebraska (Option 2) – 0.48%129 
 
In that same year, the bottom five states that spent the smallest 
percentage of the total state budget to regulate financial services were: 
 
46. Massachusetts (Option 1) – 0.09%  
47. Minnesota (Option 5) – 0.11%  
48. Indiana (Option 1) – 0.12%  
49. New Mexico (Option 2) – 0.14%  
50. Wisconsin (Option 2) – 0.15%130 
 
In almost all cases, the budgets for the state financial services regulators 
are derived from the fees collected by the agencies from the financial 
services firms that they regulate.  
 Finally, state governments have a range of attitudes regarding the need 
for government regulation of business in general. These attitudes may 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. See infra Appendix A. 
 130. See infra Appendix A. 
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affect how much states are willing to spend to regulate financial services, 
which in turn may affect the level of consumer protection available in 
different states. How to accurately capture these differences in attitudes 
is problematic as different rankings of states regarding how much they 
regulate business in general sometimes produce vastly different results. 
For example, both Forbes magazine and the Small Business & 
Entrepreneurship Council (SBEC) rank the 50 states based on their 
regulatory and tax environments for businesses.131 In 2010, SBEC ranked 
South Dakota, Nevada, Texas, Wyoming, and Washington as having the 
five best business climates for small businesses, which they define as 
having the lowest level of regulation and business taxes, while it ranked 
New Jersey, New York, California, Vermont, and Maine as having the 
worst business climates.132 Forbes, on the other hand, rated Utah, 
Virginia, North Carolina, Colorado, and Washington as having the five 
best regulatory environments for business and Maine, Rhode Island, 
Mississippi, Michigan, and Hawaii as having the worst.133  
As the above problems illustrate, a comparison of state regulatory 
structures may eliminate or minimize some of the problems inherent when 
making comparisons among nations. However, it still leaves other 
differences that need to be controlled for if one is going to ascertain 
whether an integrated regulatory structure is preferable to the current 
multiple agency structure. 
 IV. HYPOTHESES 
In this section we develop a series of hypotheses to test whether a 
regulatory regime that relies on separate regulators for each major 
financial service (Option 1) is more expensive or less expensive than the 
consolidated regimes (Options 2 to 6). Prior to conducting our 
regressions, we expected to find that consolidated regulation would be 
less expensive than a regime that used multiple regulatory agencies. One 
can imagine a number of reasons why a single financial regulator might 
be more cost effective than multiple regulators. The multiple regulator 
approach embodied in Option 1 (multiple regulators) potentially entails 
the following costs, which could be minimized or eliminated by 
consolidating some or all of the regulatory agencies: 
 
 131. Badenhausen, Kurt, Best Places - Table: The Best States for Business and Careers, Forbes 
(Oct. 13, 2010) http://www.forbes.com/2010/10/13/best-states-for-business-business-beltway-best-
states-table.html; SBEC, Small Business Survival Index 2010 Ranks State Policy Climates for 
Entrepreneurship, Business News Press Release (Dec. 9, 2010) 
http://www.sbecouncil.org/news/display.cfm?ID=4099 ["SBEC, 2010 Rankings"]. SBEC has been 
conducting an annual ranking of the states for the past fifteen years. SBEC, 2010 Rankings.  
 132. SBEC, 2010 Rankings, supra note 131. 
 133. Badenhausen, supra note 131. 
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• Multiple regulators may fail to communicate and cooperate 
with one another effectively. 
• Multiple regulators may issue inconsistent or duplicative 
regulations. 
• Multiple regulators may create confusion for consumers who 
may find it difficult to ascertain which agency is responsible for 
the relevant financial firm, product, or service. 
• Multiple regulators may fail to adequate address the range of 
conflict of interest problems posed by financial 
conglomerates. 
• Multiple regulators that specialize in a particular financial 
segment may be more prone to agency capture than more 
diversified single regulators. 
 
For example, a single state agency may eliminate regulatory overlap and 
duplication as well as the inter-agency turf wars, in which the agencies 
frequently engage. 
One might have expected to see lower costs with a single agency 
because economies of scale would allow the single agency to perform the 
same functions with fewer people than are currently employed by all of 
the state agencies combined. The single agency could also reassign 
agency officials to where the needs are the greatest more easily than the 
individual smaller agencies can. Internal services that are common to all 
of the state agencies, such as human resources, purchasing, and 
accounting, could also achieve cost savings by achieving economies of 
scale and reducing duplication of efforts.134 
To varying degrees, some U.S. states have benefited from these types 
of economies of scale cost savings. The State of Illinois was able to save 
14% in 2004 over the amount it spent in 2003 to regulate financial 
services by consolidating some of its separate financial regulators to form 
the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation in 2004.135 
While Michigan’s regulatory expenses increased initially in 2001 and 
2002 after creating its single financial services regulatory agency, they 
decreased substantially in 2003.136 In 2003, Michigan spent 14% less than 
 
 134. California Performance Review Commission, A Government for the People for a Change 
(Aug. 3, 2004), https://immagic.com/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/CAGOV_US/C040803H.pdf 
(last accessed May 7, 2019). The report cited the consolidation of internal services to achieve economies 
of scale as a major benefit of its proposal to dramatically consolidate the number of California 
departments, agencies and boards. Id. at 96. 
 135. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, PRESS RELEASE, 
Five Agency Merger Will Net $14 million in Savings (Feb. 18, 2004). 
 136. MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR & ECON. GROWTH, 2001 ANN. REP. 
10 (2001) [hereinafter MI OFIS 2001 ANN. REP.]. MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES, DEP’T. OF LABOR 
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it spent in 1999 to regulate financial services.137  
Nevertheless, in constructing our tests, we choose to employ the use of 
a categorical variable for the different regulatory options. The base case 
is Option 1, in which multiple agencies are used to regulate financial 
services. A negative (positive) coefficient will indicate that the option is 
cheaper (more expensive) than the base case.  
The first two hypotheses examine the costs of the consolidated 
regulatory options relative to the costs of Option 1 (multiple regulators) 
without accounting for other factors, such as population or the amount of 
the gross domestic product based on financial services: 
 
H1: Option 1 is more expensive than Options 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.  
H2: Option 1 is more expensive than Options 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 after 
controlling for year fixed effects. 
 
The next hypothesis attempts to account for the fact that significant 
differences in population size amongst the states may influence the 
amount an individual state will spend to regulate financial services: 
 
H3: Option 1 is more expensive than Options 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 after 
taking into account differences in population. 
The last hypothesis undertakes the same analysis as H6 but excludes 
states that are outliers because they are the only state within a particular 
regulatory option, such as Michigan in Option 6, or because they are 
unusually large: 
 
H7: Option 1 is more expensive than Options 2, 4, and 5 after 
excluding the possible outlying states of California, Michigan, and 
New Jersey and taking into account differences in gross state 
domestic product and controlling for year fixed effects.138 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Sample Selection  
We have collected data on how much each state and the District of 
 
& ECON. GROWTH, 2002 ANN. REP. 11 (2002) [hereinafter MI OFIS 2002 ANN. REP.]. 
 137. MICH. FIN. INST. BUREAU, 1999 ANN. REP, supra note 71, at 55; MICH. INS. BUREAU, 1999 
ANN. REP., supra note 71, at 25; MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES 2003 ANN. REP., supra note 71, at 
11. 
 138. California was also excluded because it is significantly larger than any other state, which 
makes it is an outlier in terms of financial spending. For Option 3 (consolidated agency for banking and 
insurance), we only have complete data for New Jersey and for Option 6 (single agency organized to 
regulate for risk not sector), we only have data for Michigan.  
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Columbia spent to regulate financial services from 1990 to 2006.139 For 
purposes of this article, only the data from 2001 to 2004 was used. We 
only used this data because the Michigan OFIS was not created until April 
2000. As a result, we only have a full year’s worth of data for Option 6 
(single agency organized to regulate based on risk rather than sector) 
beginning in 2001.  
We decided to look at the data over this period of time because it could 
enable one to eliminate or account for isolated fluctuations in a state’s 
budget in a particular year. It also allows one to gather anecdotal evidence 
of how much each state’s costs have changed if it consolidated regulatory 
agencies or created new ones during this period. Finally, it also allows 
one to see to what extent states’ spending changed to accommodate 
changes in federal regulation.  
Because of the transparency issues mentioned above, we encountered 
difficulties in gathering complete budgetary data for all 50 states. We had 
complete data on the states’ budgets for a total of 150 observations for the 
years 2001 to 2004. If we had complete data for all of the states for 2001 
to 2004, we would have a total of 204 observations. Since we did not have 
complete data for all of the states for 2001 to 2004, we can only reach 
preliminary conclusions based on the data available. In addition, we only 
had one state, Michigan, which used the regulatory structure of Option 6 
(single regulator organized to regulate for risk not sectors) between 2001 
and 2004, and we only had complete data on one state, New Jersey, for 
Option 3 (consolidated agency for banking and insurance) for the period 
from 2001 to 2004. It is difficult to be certain that any results finding cost 
savings from using Options 3 and 6 are reliable given the extremely 
limited number of observations available to us for those categories.  
To provide an example of what the compiled data looks like, we have 
supplied the data for the year 2002 in the table in Appendix A. This table 
provides the available data for the total amount that each state spent on 
financial services regulation in 2002. In order to give some sense as to 
how much each state spends to regulate financial services given the size 
of the banking, securities, and insurance sectors contributions to the 
state’s GDP, the ratio of regulatory costs per million dollars of GDP 
produced in the financial services as defined by North American Industry 
 
 139. In addition, to gathering budgetary data, we collected data regarding the workloads of the state 
regulators, e.g., how many entities do they regulate, how many charters or licenses did they issue, how 
many enforcement actions did they bring, and how many consumer complaints did they receive. We hope 
to use this data to measure the budgets of the states in relation to the outputs of states to determine if some 
states have lower budgets given the size of the financial services industry within the state because the 
states are simply not doing much to regulate the industry or enforce the laws regulating the industry. This 
data is still incomplete, and we are still assessing the best way to measure these outputs. 
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Classification system is provided.140 In addition, the regulatory costs per 
person living within the state are provided as another benchmark for 
gauging how much each state spends to regulate financial services. 
As the table in Appendix A indicates, states show a wide variation on 
how much they spend to regulate financial services within their 
boundaries. As a share of GDP from financial services, South Dakota 
spent the least to regulate financial services by spending only $599 per 
million dollars of GDP from financial services and Alaska spent the most 
by spending $7,062 per million of GDP from financial services. On a per 
capita basis, Indiana spent the least, $1.99 per person, and the District of 
Columbia spent the most, $19.64. On average, in 2002, the states spent 
$2,617 per million dollars of GDP generated by the financial services 
industry within the state or $5.42 per person residing in the state to 
regulate financial services. Not surprisingly, given the lack of federal 
regulation for insurance, states spend on average almost two-thirds of 
their budgets for financial services regulation on insurance regulation. 
Table 3 provides a comparison of the average regulatory costs of states 
that use each of the six regulatory options described in the table in 
Appendix A. 
 
 140. The North American Industry Classification system was adopted following the signing and 
ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement in order to harmonize the industrial 
classification systems of the United States, Canada and Mexico. North American Industry Classification 
System, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/faqs/faqs.html#q1 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2019).  
38
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol87/iss4/1
2019] STRUCTURES FOR REGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES 929 
Table 3: Average Costs for States that Use the Six Different Regulatory 
Options for 2002141 
 
Regulatory Costs per Million 
Dollars of State GDP for 
Finance & Insurance Sector 
(in constant 2000 dollars) 
Regulatory Costs 




Option 1  $2,470.81 $4.93 
Option 2 $3,127.55 $5.59 
Option 3 $1,137.62 $3.99 
Option 4 $3,207.61 $9.42 
Option 5 $2,915.94 $5.81 
Option 6 $1,831.17 $3.51 
B. Regression Results 
Throughout all of the models, cost is the dependent variable. The cost 
for different years has been converted into 2004 dollars using the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics inflation calculator. In the first regression the model 
that is tested is: 
 




Costit is the cost to state i in year t. 
 
 
 141. This data is still preliminary for several reasons. First, some states have embedded the division 
or department that regulates securities in another agency and that agency does not usually provide 
breakdowns of its budget for each division or department. As a result, the direct costs of financial 
regulation of securities could not be included and the total direct costs of financial regulation in those 
states are understated. Second, not all states use the same fiscal year for budgeting purposes and so the 
time frames for comparison purposes may be off by three to six months. In addition, one state, Oregon, 
only uses biennium budgets, not annual budgets. CSBS Profile, supra note 19, at 35; CAL. DEP’T. FIN. 
INST. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 24-25; GA DEP’T. OF BANKING AND FINANCE ANN. REP., supra note 
19; HAW. COMPLIANCE RES. FUND REP., supra note 19; IND. DEP’T. OF FIN. INST. ANN. REP., supra note 
19, at 16; IOWA ANN. REP. OF SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKING, supra note 19, at 27; MISS. DEP’T. 
BANKING & CONSUMER FIN. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 12-14; 2002 N.Y. BANKING DEP’T ANN. REP., 
supra note 19, at 1 (2002); S.C. BOARD OF FIN. INST. ANN. ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 19; VT 
ANN. REP. INS. COMM’R, supra note 19, at 10; WASH. DEP’T. FIN. INST. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 2; 
W.VA. ANN. REP. FIN. INST., supra note 19, at 14, 18, 23; State of Illinois Department of Financial and 
Professional Regulation website, supra note 19; MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES, ANN. REPORT 2003, 
supra note 71.  
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Optionit is a vector of variables which indicates under which regulatory 
option state i is operating in year t. The option is a categorical variable. 
The options that are represented are:  
 
• Option 1: Separate Agency for banking, securities, and 
insurance firms 
• Option 2: Banks and securities firms 
• Option 3: Banks and insurers 
• Option 4: Securities firms and insurers 
• Option 5: Single agency containing divisions for banking, 
securities, and insurance 
• Option 6: Single supervisor for financial services 
 
The results from testing H1 (Option 1 is more expensive than Options 
2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) are as follows:  
 
Variable Coefficient P-Value 
Option 2 - 1.36 E 07 0.07 
Option 3 2.84 E 07 0.15 
Option 4 - 1.62 E07 0.36 
Option 5 -2.61 E 07 <0.01 
Option 6 4.30 E 06 0.83 
 
As noted above, this regression, and all that follow, employs the use of a 
categorical variable for the different regulatory options. The base case is 
Option 1, which was described previously in the article. A negative 
(positive) coefficient indicates that the option is cheaper (more expensive) 
than the base case. The results indicate that only Option 5 (combined 
regulator) is statistically significant at the 0.05 level and appear to be 
associated with lower costs than Option 1 (multiple regulators). The other 
options show no statistically significant difference. The adjusted R-square 
for this regression was approximately 0.05. 
The second model that is tested is: 
 
Costit =  + optionit + yeart +it 
 
Where the cost and option variables are the same as above.  
 
Year is a vector of variables indicating the year in order to control for 
intertemporal changes common to all states in the sample.  
The results from testing H2 (Option 1 is more expensive than Options 
2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 after taking into account the year fixed effects) are as 
follows:  
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Variable Coefficient P-Value 
Option 2 - 1.40 E 07 0.072 
Option 3 2.93 E 07 0.143 
Option 4 - 1.64 E07 0.360 
Option 5 -2.67 E 07 0.005 
Option 6 3.82 E 06 0.849 
Year 2001 -287,504.1 0.978 
Year 2002 -1.31 E 06 0.897 
Year 2003 -148,704.2 0.988 
Year 2004 5.47 E 06 0.606 
 
The results again indicate that Option 5 (combined regulator) appears to 
be associated with lower costs than Option 1 (multiple regulators). The 
other options show no statistically significant difference. The adjusted R-
square for this regression was approximately 0.0291. 
The next model controlled for differences in the population size of the 
states. The model tested was: 
 
Costit =  + optionit + popit +it 
 
 Where the cost and option variables are the same as above.  
 
Pop is the estimated population in state i in year t.  
 
The results from testing H3 (Option 1 is more expensive than Options 
2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 after taking into account differences in population) are as 
follows:  
 
Variable Coefficient P-Value 
Option 2 4.44 E 06 0.101 
Option 3 2.17 E 07 0.002 
Option 4 - 8.50 E 06 0.168 
Option 5 5.41 E 06 0.109 
Option 6 -1.05 E 07 0.127 
Estimated population 5.25 <.001 
 
The results this time indicate that Option 3, which is statistically 
significant at the .01 level, (banking and insurance combined), appears to 
be associated with higher costs than Option 1 (multiple regulators). The 
other options show no statistically significant difference. The estimated 
population variable is statistically significant at the .01 level. The adjusted 
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R-square for this regression was approximately 0.88.142 
When controlling for the estimated population of the state, we find that 
only Option 3 is statistically significantly different from Option 1. Option 
5 is not statistically significant when the population of the state is 
controlled for. We also do not detect a difference among the other options.  
However, it is important to note that while Option 3 is statistically 
significant the difference is actually quite small. When controlling for 
population on average, Option 3 is approximately $21 million more 
expensive than Option 1. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE LINES OF INQUIRY 
A. Conclusions 
 Our results indicate that for most of the consolidated regulatory 
options, there does not appear to be a statistically significant association 
between lower costs and consolidated regulatory regimes. In fact, our 
results find that Option 3, in which banking and insurance regulation is 
consolidated into a single agency, is associated with higher costs than 
using Option 1 or multiple regulators.  
It is unclear at this time why Option 3 appears to be more expensive 
than Option 1. It may be due to the fact that, as previously mentioned, the 
Option 1 numbers may understate how much some of the states are 
spending for financial services because of the difficulty of obtaining data 
on spending for securities regulation for some Option 1 states, particularly 
New York.143 Figure 8 below shows the variation among the states for 
which complete data was available.  
 
 142. Please note: the population of the state was highly correlated with the size of the financial 
services industry variable. Therefore, due to concerns about multicollinearity both variables could not be 
included in the regression. Further, the population of the state is more likely to be exogenous than the size 
of the financial services industry which could have issues of endogeneity. It should be noted, however 
that the results were similar when the size of the financial services industry variable was used instead of 
the population variable. 
 143. New York regulates securities through its Office of the Attorney General and the Office of the 
Secretary of State. Neither of the publicly available budgets for these offices provide a breakdown of how 
much they spend to regulate securities. Although we submitted Freedom of Information Act requests with 
these agencies, they have declined to provide us with this data on the grounds that they do not publish the 
accounts for the divisions within the Attorney General’s office.  
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Figure 8: Regulatory costs per million dollars of GDP from financial 
services for the states with complete data that used one of the six 
different regulatory options for 2002144 
It would be worthwhile to investigate what exactly is driving Option 3 
states to spend more than Option 1 states. 
Does the failure to find that consolidation leads to cost savings mean 
that the United States would not benefit from moving to a single financial 
regulator? Not necessarily. Costs are only half of the analysis when doing 
cost-benefit analysis. One still needs to assess the benefits and weigh 
them against the costs before concluding that it would not be in the 
interests of the United States to change its regulatory structure. Given that 
most of the consolidator regulatory regimes used at the state level do not 
appear to be associated with higher costs, moving to single financial 
services regulator would likely not be precluded on the grounds that it 
would result in higher operating costs on an annual basis than the current 
multiple regulator model now used. Moving from one regime to another 
would entail some initial, one-time expenses. We have not attempted to 
estimate those expenses in this article, although it may be worth 
investigating if policymakers are persuaded that a single financial 
services regulator offers sufficient benefits in other areas, such as 
consumer protection, to warrant changing models. 
Other articles have outlined from a theoretical perspective the 
advantages and disadvantages that the United States would face if it 
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decided to move to a single financial services agency.145 These studies 
discuss some of the substantial advantages that a single financial services 
regulator offers over the current U.S. regulatory regime, which include, 
among others:  
 
• A single regulator would be better than the current regime because 
it would be able to monitor risks across firms and sectors and 
address such risks strategically.  
• A single regulator would be able to regulate financial 
conglomerates more effectively. 
• A single regulator would be able to respond more effectively to the 
globalization of the financial markets.  
• A single regulator would be less prone to capture.  
• A single regulator would provide improved consumer 
protections.146  
 
 A complete cost-benefit analysis also needs to assess the following 
costs to society:147  
 
• A single regulator would reduce regulatory competition and 
experimentation to the extent that both are present in the current 
system. 
• A single regulator may have difficulty prioritizing issues. 
• A single regulator may have difficulty responding to smaller firms 
and, thus, may undermine the diversity of institutions that 
currently comprise the financial industry within the state. 
• A single regulator may lose or fail to develop staff with specialized 
knowledge related to large and small companies and industry 
sectors. 
• A single regulator may lack transparency when making rules. 
• A single regulator may lack accountability to both consumers and 
market participants. 
• A single regulator may experience significant logistical problems 
when it merges the existing regulators in order to be created. 
 
It may be impossible to accurately assess some of these costs in advance. 
In addition, when considering these costs, policymakers should also 
review the ways that some of the costs could either be eliminated or 
 
 145. Brown, E Pluribus, supra note 4. 
 146. Brown, E Pluribus, supra note 4; Brown, Consolidated Financial Regulation, supra note 2. 
 147. GAO FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT, supra. note 6, at 130-31; Martinez & Rose, supra note 
2 at 27-31. 
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reduced, which have been outlined in some of the studies done to date on 
single financial regulators. 
B. Future Lines of Inquiry 
As we have indicated, our results are preliminary because we have not 
been able to obtain complete budgetary data for all 50 states. We will only 
have a full picture of how much it costs the state governments to regulator 
financial services after we obtain all of the budgetary data on how states 
regulate securities. 
Based on the preliminary data from the states, it appears that the 
question of whether states should adopt a single financial regulator model 
or maintain separate regulators for the different financial sectors will not 
turn solely on the direct costs that may be paid by the state governments. 
If the results are the same after obtaining complete budgetary data for the 
states, it would indicate that consolidation by itself does not guarantee any 
cost savings. Other factors, such as regulatory intensity of a state and the 
regulatory economies of scale, need to be accounted for when determining 
whether consolidation will achieve any cost savings. 
It might, therefore, be useful to attempt to control for some factors that 
we did not control for in this study. For example, it might be useful to 
discern what role economies of scale play in the costs to state 
governments of regulating financial services. Larger states may take 
advantage of economies of scale, which may exceed the cost savings one 
might expect to achieve from consolidated regulation. Five of the Option 
5 states—Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Oregon, and Vermont—have relatively 
small populations and relatively small GDPs from financial services. If 
one examines Figure 9, one can see that the spending by these states may 
mask the benefits of consolidated regulation because of their inability to 
take advantage of economies of scale available to larger states.  
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Figure 9: Regulatory costs per million dollars of GDP from financial 
services for all of the states that used one of the six different regulatory 
options for 2002148 
 
It would also be useful to determine to what extent cost savings may 
be possible from eliminating the regulatory overlap and duplication 
between state and federal regulators for banking and securities and among 
state regulators for insurance. One might not be getting an accurate 
picture of what the cost savings would be for the United States if it 
consolidated all of its regulators into a single agency by looking at the 
effect of agency consolidation at the state level. Much of the overlap and 
duplication of financial services regulation in the United States is not 
between state banking, insurance, and securities agencies, but between 
state agencies and federal agencies or among state regulators. Thus, one 
avenue for future research would be to attempt to determine what the cost 
savings would be if duplicative federal and state regulatory efforts are 
eliminated. 
Another avenue for further investigation is how much financial 
services firms would save in terms of their spending to comply with 
federal and state regulations if all duplicative and overlapping regulations 
were eliminated. This article has looked only at the amounts spent by state 
governments to operate their regulatory agencies. Simply looking at the 
amount that the government spends to regulate financial services 
underestimates the total costs to the various state regulatory regimes 
within the United States because it does not capture how much more 
 
 148. See infra Appendix A. 
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companies and individuals must pay to operate within each state. The 
regulatory costs are a fraction of the fees, assessments, and taxes that the 
state and federal governments charge financial services firms. For 
example, in 2002, state insurance department budgets totaled $946.6 
million but the total revenues generated from fees, assessments, fines, 
penalties, and taxes assessed by states on insurance companies totaled 
$12.52 billion.149 The state insurance department budgets represented 
only 7.56 percent of the total revenues generated. In order to assess the 
total costs for the current regulatory regime, the amount spent by firms 
and individuals to comply with the regulatory requirements of the system 
must also be taken into account.  
In the United States, insurance companies must become licensed in 
each state in which they want to offer insurance and must get 
authorization from these states for the products that it offers. If a new 
company wants to offer insurance in all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia, it must first apply for a license to operate from each one of 
these 51 jurisdictions, then it must seek advanced approval from each of 
these 51 jurisdictions for each of its products that it will offer, and finally 
it must obtain a license for each producer or agent in each state who will 
sell its products.150 The costs involved in completing the applications for 
all of these licenses as well as paying the relevant fees are significant, 
creating a barrier to entry, particularly for small firms. Efforts by NAIC 
to encourage uniformity and coordination among states have not been 
extremely successful.  
In 2002, the total number of domestic insurers (insurers domiciled in 
the state in which the business is written) in the 50 states and the District 
of Columbia equaled 7,090, or an average of 139 domestic insurers per 
state.151 The number of foreign insurers (insurers domiciled in a state 
different from the state in which the business is written) is larger than the 
number of domestic insurers in every state. On average, 1,357 foreign 
insurers operate in each state, which means that, on average, foreign 
insurers comprise a little over 90 percent of the total number of insurers 
in a state.152  
If one assumes that states generally charge the same taxes, fees, 
assessments, fines, and penalties to foreign insurers as to domestic 
insurers, than states raised $10.88 billion of the $12.52 billion in total 
revenue that states earned from taxes, fees, assessments, fines, penalties, 
and other sources from foreign insurers.153 Most of this $10.88 billion 
 
 149. NAIC 2002 REPORT, supra note 112, at 22 and 25. 
 150. BAIR REPORT, supra note 6, at 11-12. 
 151. NAIC 2002 REPORT, supra note 112, at 30 and 39. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 25 and 39.  
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could be saved if insurers only had to pay fees and assessments to the state 
in which they were domiciled. These added costs create barriers to entry 
and reduce competition in the insurance sector.154 
Compliance costs for other financial services providers are equally 
daunting. According to banking industry estimates, banking institutions, 
prior to the 2008 financial crisis, spent approximately $25 billion annually 
to comply with federal and state regulations.155 In the wake of the Dodd-
Frank Act and its accompanying regulations, compliance costs for the 
financial services have gone up.156 Financial services firms will attempt 
to pass along to their business and consumer clients the costs that they 
incur to comply with the existing regulatory regime in the United States. 
Thus, consumers and the U.S. economy as a whole pay a large price for 
the current regulatory structure. 
These numbers are crude estimates of the compliance costs to financial 
services firms under the current system. All of these costs would not be 
eliminated if the United States moved to a single financial services 
regulator. A closer examination of compliance costs by financial services 
firms is needed to determine how much they would save or would not be 
passed along to consumers if duplicative and overlapping regulations 
were eliminated. 
The other avenues of inquiry listed above would help provide a fuller 
picture of what the costs are of the current system and what costs may 
arise if the United State were to move to a single financial services 
regulator. Our preliminary results, however, suggest that costs of 
regulation are unlikely to be the determining factor in whether the United 
States should convert its regulatory regime from its current model to a 
single regulator. Instead, the value added by a single regulator model in 
other areas, such as consumer protection, probably holds the key as to 
 
 154. For example, about 66 percent of the respondents to a recent survey of life insurance providers 
considered the current state regulatory structure for insurance to impose barriers to entry, particularly for 
small firms. BAIR REPORT, supra. note 6, at 31 and 51-52. Out of 383 companies in the life insurance 
business that were sent the survey, 129 companies responded. 
 155. Opening Statement of Chairman Spencer Bachus, Hearing of Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credit Subcommittee on the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act, H.R. 1375, 1 (Mar. 27, 
2003). 
 156. See OCC, Mem. Economic Impact Analysis for Swaps Margin Final Rule (Oct. 16, 2015) 
(Estimates rule would result in compliance costs of between $2.8 billion and $5.2 billion); SEC, Pay Ratio 
Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. 50104, 50161 (Oc. 18, 2015)(Estimates total compliance costs for affected 
registrants would be approximately $1.3 billion); CFPB, Home Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation C), 80 
Fed. Reg. 66128, 66295 (Oct. 28, 2015)(Estimates rule will result in compliance costs of up to $1.2 billion 
for repository institutions with less than $10 billion in assets); CFTC, Margin Requirements for Uncleared 
Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 81 Fed. Reg. 636, 692 (Jan. 6, 2016) (Estimates 
rule would result in compliances costs of up to $2.05 billion). But see, Llewellyn Hinkes-Jones, How 
Much Did Dodd-Frank Cost? Don’t Ask Banks, BNA.com, Feb. 2, 2017, 
https://www.bna.com/doddfrank-cost-dont-n57982083211/  (Discusses the difficulties in estimating how 
much compliance costs have gone up for banks). 
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Alabama 1 $6,203 $22,330,377.14 $3,599.93 $4.99 
Alaska 5 $884 $6,243,613.72 $7,062.91 $9.75 
Arizona 1 $13,068 $12,911,389.82 $988.02 $2.37 
Arkansas 1 $3,045 $16,059,340.64 $5,274.00 $5.93 
California 1 $88,174 $199,699,344.99 $2,264.83 $5.70 
Colorado 5 $11,444 $11,197,528.00 $978.46 $2.49 
Connecticut 2 $24,272 $34,268,925.06 $1,411.87 $9.91 
Delaware 1 $13,717 $8,416,645.53 $613.59 $10.45 
District of 
Columbia 4 $3,308 $11,368,848.32 $3,436.77 $19.64 
Florida 5 $34,554 $70,920,443.29 $2,052.45 $4.25 
Georgia 1 $16,989 $27,465,984.90 $1,616.69 $3.19 
Hawaii 5 $1,975 $13,912,779.20 $7,044.45 $11.28 
Idaho 2 $1,531 $9,202,696.86 $6,010.91 $6.85 
Illinois 3 $44,072 $63,785,404.10 $1,447.30 $5.06 
Indiana 1 $10,996 $12,253,001.96 $1,114.31 $1.99 
Iowa 5 $8,863 $13,708,827.02 $1,546.75 $4.67 
 
 157. This data is still preliminary for several reasons. First, some states have embedded the division 
or department that regulates securities in another agency and that agency does not usually provide 
breakdowns of its budget for each division or department. As a result, the direct costs of financial 
regulation of securities could not be included and the total direct costs of financial regulation in those 
states are understated. Second, not all states use the same fiscal year for budgeting purposes and so the 
time frames for comparison purposes may be off by three to six months. In addition, one state, Oregon, 
only uses biennium budgets, not annual budgets. CSBS Profile, supra note 19, at 35; CAL. DEP’T. FIN. 
INST. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 24-25; GA DEP’T. OF BANKING AND FINANCE ANN. REP., supra note 
19; HAW. COMPLIANCE RES. FUND REP., supra note 19; IND. DEP’T. OF FIN. INST. ANN. REP., supra note 
19, at 16; IOWA ANN. REP. OF SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKING, supra note 19, at 27; MISS. DEP’T. 
BANKING & CONSUMER FIN. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 12-14; 2002 N.Y. BANKING DEP’T ANN. REP., 
supra note 19, at 1 (2002); S.C. BOARD OF FIN. INST. ANN. ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 19; VT 
ANN. REP. INS. COMM’R, supra note 19, at 10; WASH. DEP’T. FIN. INST. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 2; 
W.V. ANN. REP. FIN. INST., supra note 19, at 14, 18, 23; State of Illinois Department of Financial and 
Professional Regulation website, supra note 19; MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES, ANN. REPORT 2003, 
supra note 71; NAIC 2002 REPORT, supra note 112. 
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Kansas 1 $5,225 $16,197,316.00 $3,099.96 $5.97 
Kentucky 2 $5,551 $32,012,256.13 $5,766.93 $7.83 
Louisiana 2 $5,265 $26,956,899.89 $5,120.02 $6.03 
Maine 5 $2,565 $8,477,778.92 $3,305.18 $6.54 
Maryland 1 $12,978 $26,815,809.80 $2,066.25 $4.93 
Massachusetts 3 $29,781 $19,356,364.58 $649.96 $3.01 
Michigan 6 $19,244 $35,239,024.58 $1,831.17 $3.51 
Minnesota 5 $18,105 $13,007,782.57 $718.46 $2.59 
Mississippi 1 $2,857 $10,159,872.28 $3,556.13 $3.55 
Missouri 1 $10,574 $18,989,886.82 $1,795.90 $3.34 
Montana 4 $1,113 $4,904,180.16 $4,406.27 $5.39 
Nebraska 2 $4,710 $11,831,512.08 $2,512.00 $6.85 
Nevada 3 $6,095 $6,778,683.80 $1,112.17 $3.12 
New 
Hampshire 1 $3,830 $8,147,964.73 $2,127.41 $6.40 
New Jersey 3 $30,475 $40,868,542.89 $1,341.05 $4.76 
New Mexico 2 $1,900 $5,329,932.43 $2,805.23 $2.87 
New York 1 $126,541 $167,385,284.21 $1,322.78 $8.73 
North 
Carolina 1 $27,755 $36,651,877.18 $1,320.55 $4.41 
North Dakota 1 $1,227 $5,760,504.20 $4,694.79 $9.09 
Ohio 2 $26,519 $41,557,524.72 $1,567.08 $3.64 
Oklahoma 1 $4,581 $15,043,242.95 $3,283.83 $4.31 
Oregon 5 $6,204 $16,420,736.64 $2,646.80 $4.66 
Pennsylvania 1 $29,886 $38,518,620.81 $1,288.85 $3.13 
Rhode Island 5 $4,509 $5,550,010.53 $1,230.87 $5.19 
South 
Carolina 1 $5,423 $9,003,478.98 $1,660.24 $2.20 
South Dakota 5 $4,421 $2,649,733.84 $599.35 $3.49 
Tennessee 4 $10,528 $18,737,637.28 $1,779.79 $3.24 
Texas 1 $45,534 $72,200,359.22 $1,585.64 $3.32 
Utah 1 $6,144 $10,120,274.90 $1,647.18 $4.35 
Vermont 5 $1,072 $6,487,875.44 $6,052.12 $10.53 
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Virginia 5 $17,949 $31,473,173.48 $1,753.48 $4.32 
Washington 2 $12,533 $20,442,986.73 $1,631.13 $3.37 
West Virginia 1 $1,748 $8,034,798.03 $4,596.57 $4.45 
Wisconsin 2 $12,228 $16,174,547.12 $1,322.75 $2.97 
Wyoming 1 $594 $2,875,164.59 $4,840.34 $5.76 
Total  $788,759.00 $1,343,906,789.07   
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Total Banking and 
Insurance Regulatory 
Appropriations per 
Million Dollars of 
Fin. & Ins. State GDP 
(in constant 2000 
dollars) 
Total Banking & 
Insurance 
Regulatory Costs 
(in constant 2000 
dollars) per person 
Alabama 1 $19,881,129.46 $3,205.08 $4.44 
Alaska 5 $6,243,613.72 $7,062.91 $9.75 
Arizona 1 $8,531,892.22 $652.88 $1.57 
Arkansas 1 $14,247,598.58 $4,679.01 $5.26 
California 1 $175,310,886.96 $1,988.24 $5.01 
Colorado 5 $11,197,528.00 $978.46 $2.49 
Connecticut 2 $34,268,925.06 $1,411.87 $9.91 
Delaware 1 $7,824,331.16 $570.41 $9.71 
District of 
Columbia 4 $11,368,848.32 $3,436.77 $19.64 
Florida 5 $70,920,443.29 $2,052.45 $4.25 
Georgia 1 $27,465,984.90 $1,616.69 $3.19 
Hawaii 5 $9,546,830.74 $4,833.84 $7.74 
Idaho 2 $9,202,696.86 $6,010.91 $6.85 
Illinois 3 $63,785,404.10 $1,447.30 $5.06 
Indiana 1 $11,412,939.75 $1,037.92 $1.85 
Iowa 5 $12,786,100.20 $1,442.64 $4.36 
Kansas 1 $13,433,368.29 $2,570.98 $4.95 
Kentucky 2 $29,747,524.72 $5,358.95 $7.28 
Louisiana 2 $26,956,899.89 $5,120.02 $6.03 
Maine 5 $8,477,778.92 $3,305.18 $6.54 
Maryland 1 $24,827,499.10 $1,913.05 $4.56 
 
 158. CSBS Profile, supra note 19, at 35; CAL. DEP’T. FIN. INST. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 24-
25; GA DEP’T. OF BANKING AND FINANCE ANN. REP., supra note 19; HAW. COMPLIANCE RES. FUND 
REP., supra note 19; IND. DEP’T. OF FIN. INST. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 16; IOWA ANN. REP. OF 
SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKING, supra note 19, at 27; MISS. DEP’T. BANKING & CONSUMER FIN. ANN. 
REP., supra note 19, at 12-14; 2002 N.Y. BANKING DEP’T ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 1 (2002); S.C. 
BOARD OF FIN. INST. ANN. ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 19; VT ANN. REP. INS. COMM’R, supra 
note 19, at 10; WASH. DEP’T. FIN. INST. ANN. REP., supra note 19, at 2; W.V. ANN. REP. FIN. INST., supra 
note 19, at 14, 18, 23; State of Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation website, supra 
note 19; MICH. OFF. OF FIN. & INS. SERVICES, ANN. REPORT 2003, supra note 71; NAIC 2002 REPORT, 
supra note 112. 
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Total Banking and 
Insurance Regulatory 
Appropriations per 
Million Dollars of 
Fin. & Ins. State GDP 
(in constant 2000 
dollars) 
Total Banking & 
Insurance 
Regulatory Costs 
(in constant 2000 
dollars) per person 
Massachusetts 3 $19,356,364.58 $649.96 $3.01 
Michigan 6 $35,239,024.58 $1,831.17 $3.51 
Minnesota 5 $13,007,782.57 $718.46 $2.59 
Mississippi 1 $10,159,872.28 $3,556.13 $3.55 
Missouri 1 $18,206,724.32 $1,721.84 $3.21 
Montana 4 $4,406,224.49 $3,958.87 $4.84 
Nebraska 2 $11,831,512.08 $2,512.00 $6.85 
Nevada 3 $6,778,683.80 $1,112.17 $3.12 
New 
Hampshire 1 $7,472,263.06 $1,950.98 $5.87 
New Jersey 3 $33,080,776.70 $1,085.51 $3.86 
New Mexico 2 $5,329,932.43 $2,805.23 $2.87 
New York 1 $167,385,284.21 $1,322.78 $8.73 
North 
Carolina 1 $33,707,442.05 $1,214.46 $4.05 
North Dakota 1 $4,733,236.97 $3,857.57 $7.47 
Ohio 2 $41,557,524.72 $1,567.08 $3.64 
Oklahoma 1 $12,054,869.54 $2,631.49 $3.46 
Oregon 5 $16,420,736.64 $2,646.80 $4.66 
Pennsylvania 1 $32,000,099.71 $1,070.74 $2.60 
Rhode Island 5 $5,550,010.53 $1,230.87 $5.19 
South 
Carolina 1 $9,003,478.98 $1,660.24 $2.20 
South Dakota 5 $2,649,733.84 $599.35 $3.49 
Tennessee 4 $17,578,182.86 $1,669.66 $3.04 
Texas 1 $63,001,694.08 $1,383.62 $2.89 
Utah 1 $9,018,400.75 $1,467.84 $3.88 
Vermont 5 $6,487,875.44 $6,052.12 $10.53 
Virginia 5 $31,473,173.48 $1,753.48 $4.32 
Washington 2 $17,446,398.65 $1,392.04 $2.87 
West Virginia 1 $8,034,798.03 $4,596.57 $4.45 
Wisconsin 2 $16,174,547.12 $1,322.75 $2.97 
Wyoming 1 $2,635,864.99 $4,437.48 $5.28 
Total  $1,259,220,737.75   
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